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Abstract
While the direct impact of geographic endowments on prosperity is present in all countries,
in former colonies, geography has also aﬀected colonization policies and institutional outcomes.
Thus, one can disentangle the partial eﬀects of endowments and institutions on income by
utilizing the interaction of geography and colonial experience. I ﬁr s td o c u m e n tt h a tc l i m a t ea n d
disease did aﬀect institutional development in the group of former colonies while this is not the
case in the rest of the world. Second, I develop an empirical strategy that identiﬁes the relation
between institutions and income but that also accounts for the direct eﬀect of endowments.
I ﬁnd that institutions are the main determinant of development and that endowments also
have a sizeable direct impact on development. Third, I highlight the importance of disease
environment for both colonization policies and income directly.
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1Is the large inequality in the wealth of nations a result of man-made history, or is it the
inevitable consequence of nature and geography that some countries are poor while others prosper?
In this paper, I estimate the partial eﬀects of institutions and geographic endowments on income.
The paper’s main contribution is to show how the interplay of geographic variation and histor-
ical events can be utilized to identify the determinants of development. While the direct impact
of climate and disease on development is present in all countries, geography had an additional
eﬀect on institutional development in former colonies through its impact on how a country was
colonized. This diﬀerence in how geography aﬀected development can be used to distinguish the
geographic from the institutional channel of development.
I ﬁnd that both geographic endowments and institutional outcomes are statistically and eco-
nomically signiﬁcant determinants of prosperity. I also document that the rivalling literatures
arguing for the importance of either endowment or institutions both overestimate the importance
of their starting hypothesis.
The second contribution of this paper is to document that by and large, the main channel
through which endowments shape economic development is the prevalence of disease. I ﬁrst
construct a measure of the geographic potential for disease and then show that disease environment
—v i ai t si n ﬂuence on settler mortality rates — was a major determinant of colonization policies
and that it continues to have a strong direct impact on prosperity, even today.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Two rivaling schools of thought emphasize either geographic endowments or institutions as the
main determinant of comparative development. The "endowments" school of thought, developed
among others by Diamond (1997), Bloom and Sachs (1998), and Gallup et al. (1998), argues
that climate, the quality of soil, and other geographic features directly impact the prevalence of
disease, the productivity of labor, and prosperity.
In contrast, the "institutions" school, pioneered in its modern form by North (1981), em-
phasizes the organization of society as the main determinant of comparative development. This
hypothesis has received strong support from the work of Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1998),
2Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002), and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2007). These authors instrument for
the endogenous quality of institutions with the ones induced by the course of history. They ﬁnd
that a large share of the variation in international income levels can be attributed to diﬀerences
in institutional quality. Moreover, a frequent ﬁnding of this literature is that, once the quality of
institutions is accounted for, endowments matter only marginally for development.
It is fair to say that the literature arguing for the importance of institutions — termed the
"new comparative economics" by Djankov et al. (2003) — is now the dominant view of develop-
ment.1 This view, however, it is not free from criticism. A major concern is that the instrumental
variables used to establish the eﬀect of institutions are collinear with endowment and early eco-
nomic development and that the instrumentation strategies are, therefore, invalid. In essence, it
can be argued that, while the new comparative economics literature has come up with natural
experiments that caused variation in the quality of institutions, it has not come up with a clear
control group that distinguishes the impact of institutions from the direct eﬀects of geography. I
set out to build such a control group.
The key insight of this study is that one can use the interaction of history and geography to
estimate the partial eﬀects of institutions and geographic endowments on prosperity. Historical
events created variation in how endowments have shaped development: in the course of colo-
nization, geographic location has aﬀected the nation by whom a country was colonized. Disease
environment, the resulting mortality rates of European settlers and early prosperity levels have
determined the way in which a country was colonized. What distinguishes the direct impact of
endowments on income from the indirect impact of endowments on colonization policies is the
following. While the direct impact is present in all countries, the institutional channel applies
only to a subset of countries, namely former colonies.2
The analysis of this paper proceeds in three steps. In the ﬁrst step, I note that most instru-
mental variables put forward by the new comparative economics literature are highly collinear
with geography. I also document that simple measures of geography, such as temperature, eleva-
1See also Easterly and Levine (2003) or Rodrik et al. (2004).
2This insight is related to Nunn and Puga (2007), who argue that internal transportation costs played a diﬀerent
role in Africa and in the rest of the world. The insight is also related to Acemoglu et al. (2005), who argue that
the rise of Atlantic trade had a diﬀerent eﬀect in countries with diﬀerent initial institutions.
3tion, or rainfall, had a diﬀerent eﬀect on development in former colonies and in the rest of the
world. I then show how the partial eﬀects of endowments and institutions on prosperity can be
disentangled in a sample including both former colonies and non-colonized countries.
The diﬀerence between the empirical analysis developed in this study and the existing liter-
ature is the following: I identify the relation between income and institutions by assuming that
the diﬀerence in how endowments have shaped development in former colonies and in the rest of
the world is the exclusive result of the institutions brought about by colonization.3 In contrast to
the existing literature, this identiﬁcation does not restrict the common eﬀect of endowments on
prosperity to be absent. It therefore allows testing whether endowments do have a direct impact
on development.
In the second step of the analysis, I demonstrate that both institutions and endowments are
statistically signiﬁcant and economically relevant determinants of development. I ﬁrst instrument
for institutions by utilizing the diﬀerential eﬀect of single measures of geographic endowments
(such as temperature, rainfall, elevation). Thereafter, I turn to an estimation in a larger sample,
including multiple measures of endowments.
In a typical speciﬁcation, I ﬁnd that for a former colony, a 0.01 standard deviation diﬀerence
in institutional outcomes is associated with a diﬀerence of roughly 1.9% in income per capita.
A 0.01 standard deviation diﬀerence in geographic endowments is associated with a diﬀerence of
roughly 1.8% in income per capita.
In the third step of the analysis, I document that disease environment is the main channel
through which endowments have shaped development. To this end, I construct a measure of
the geographic potential for disease, i.e., the level of germs that would prevail if a country was
untouched by (Western) civilization. This is done by ﬁrst estimating the relation between the
settler mortality rates collected by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and selected geographic variables, and
by then predicting the estimated model for a large set of countries. I then estimate the partial
eﬀects of disease environment on colonization policies, institutions, and income.
In a typical speciﬁcation, I ﬁnd that, in the group of former colonies, a 1% higher (worse)
3This paper does not distinguish the narrow deﬁnition of institutions emphasizing laws and the structure of
government from the "thicker" deﬁnition of institutions, which relates institutional outcomes to an informal set of
r u l e si n t r i n s i ct oas o c i e t y .
4level of disease is associated with a roughly 1.2% lower level of income per capita. In a baseline
estimation of this paper, around 0.9% of the total eﬀect is attributed to the institution-building
channel, i.e., the impact that settler mortality rates had on colonization policies and institutions.
The remaining 0.3% is attributed to the direct impact of disease on income.4 Moreover, I document
that, once the level of disease is accounted for, variables that are often used as general proxies for
endowments — a "tropics" dummy or measures of climate — do not matter for development.
After presenting the two main results of this study, I engage in an extensive robustness analysis.
I ﬁrst document that the presented results are not dependent on the inclusion of certain groups
of countries such as Africa or the four European oﬀshoots. I address the fact that colonization is
endogenous to early development. I adopt diﬀerent deﬁnitions to classify countries into the group
of former colonies or the group of non-colonized countries. Last, I include other instruments for
institutions to the estimation and present the associated overidentiﬁcation-tests.
For these robustness tests, I ﬁnd results that emphasize the basic ﬁnding of this study: both
geography and institutions are statistically signiﬁcant and economically relevant determinants of
development. This study also reconciles the contrasting ﬁndings of the existing literature arguing
for the importance of either endowments or institutions. In the new comparative economics
literature, identifying the relation between institutions and income attributes all of the correlation
between endowments and income to the impact of institutions. Similarly, the economic geography
literature attributes all of this correlation to the direct impact of endowments. Consequently, any
study that does not allow for the presence of both channels of development is biased in the
direction of its starting hypothesis.
The structure of this paper is the following. The Section 2 discusses the instruments of the new
comparative economics literature and Section 3 demonstrates how the partial eﬀects of endowment
and institutions can be estimated. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 analyzes the role of
disease environment. Sections 7 presents the robustness analysis and Section 8 concludes.
4This ﬁnding is in line with the results of Weil (2007), who estimates that health has a signiﬁcant but small
eﬀect on income per capita.
52 Two Theories, One Correlation?
The importance of constraints on the government for economic growth has been acknowledged at
least since the work of Smith (1776). North (1981) deﬁnes institutions as the "norms designed to
constrain the behavior of individuals in the interest of [...] the principal" (p. 202). Institutions,
however are endogenous to income and the early empirical literature — see for example Knack
and Keefer (1995) hence was struggling to establish the causal eﬀect of institutions on economic
outcomes.
Starting with Mauro (1995), the literature arguing for the importance of institutions on income
therefore instruments for the quality of institutions with the institutions brought forward by a
nation’s colonization experience.5 Because also colonization is endogenous to early development,
the authors exploit exogenous variation in colonization policies rather than colonization itself to
instrument for institutions.
La Porta et al. (1998) propose dummies for the identity of the colonizer as an instrument
for institutional outcomes. These authors argue that owing their fundamentally diﬀerent legal
systems, diﬀerent colonizers such as France and Britain installed diﬀerent institutions in the
countries they colonized.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) put forward the mortality rates of European settlers as a measure of
colonization policies. They argue that in places unfavorable to European physiology, the main
objective of the colonizers was to extract resources by corrupting local institutions. In contrast,
when chances of survival where high, European settlers came in large numbers and the focus of
the colonizers was to produce rather than to extract, leading them to install institutions geared
towards facilitating production and ensuring property rights.
Related to the settler mortality rates are measures of early prosperity used by Acemoglu et
al. (2002). The authors argue that colonizers were more likely to install extractive institutions
in initially rich areas, while they installed institutions geared towards investment in initially poor
colonies.
5Mauro (1995) was the ﬁrst to instrument for instutions. His work does not focus on colonzation and is tehrefore
not discussed in this section. Early empircal studies also include the work of Knack and Keefer (1995).
6Feyrer and Sacerdote (2007) instrument for the timing of colonization of islands with the
prevailing winds. The authors argue that wind speed and direction inﬂuenced the timing of
discovery by European sailors and the resulting length of colonization.
These four papers and the large literature deriving from them hold in common the set of four
underlying assumptions:
1. The colonization policies adopted by the colonizers created diﬀerences in early institutional
arrangements.
2. Colonization policies themselves depended on the local conditions prevailing in the respective
colony.
3. Early institutional arrangements persist until today.
4. The local conditions shaping colonization policies did not aﬀect development directly and
are also not correlated with some unobservable characteristics that inﬂuence prosperity.
This paper examines the last of these four assumptions.
It is evident that the instrumental variables developed in the current literature are highly
colinear with geographic endowments (see Dollar and Kray (2003) and also Table 1). The mere
collinearity between these variables, however, does not invalidate the results of the comparative
economics literature: it is possible to control for the eﬀects of endowments by including the
respective variables.
What is essential for the analysis of this paper is the fact that variation in geographic en-
dowments itself caused variation in the proposed instruments for institutions. The naval power
Britain was more likely to conquer coastal and farther from Europe territories, than was France.
The quality of soil, the abundance of natural resources, and climate determined early development
and pre-colonial income levels. Climate and landscape also determined the natural prevalence of
disease and, therefore, settler mortality rates. While it is very reasonable to argue that the pre-
vailing winds do not have any sizeable direct impact on prosperity, wind directions are correlated
with latitude and climate.
7To some extent, the literature arguing for the importance of institutions and the literature
arguing for the importance of endowments interpret the same correlation very diﬀerently. For
example, Hall and Jones (1999) use latitude as a measure of "social capital," while others have
used it as a proxy for endowments. The settler mortality rate of Acemoglu et al. (2001) were
"obviously a function of ecological conditions, and this raises the question of whether [Acemoglu
et al. (2001)] unwittingly gave a starring role to geography" (Rodrik (2005), p. 4).
Endowments have shaped colonization policies, but they also have a direct impact on pros-
perity. The strategy of the current literature is to control for endowments and to then document
that the proposed instruments also predict institutional quality conditional on the included vari-
ables. This somewhat misses the point: geography itself aﬀected the way in which a country was
colonized. Therefore, simply running a horse race between direct measures of endowments and
the proposed instruments does not distinguish between the two theories of development. While
the impact of endowments and of colonization policies are observationally equivalent in a sample
of former colonies, they can be disentangled in a larger sample that also includes non-colonized
countries.
The methodology of this paper is best exempliﬁed for the theory of Acemoglu et al. (2001).
These authors argue that diﬀerences in the mortality rates of European settlers in former colonies
led to very diﬀerent institutional policies pursued by the colonizing nations. This stands in
contrast to the endowment view predicting that geography determines a country’s disease envi-
ronment, which has direct consequences for prosperity.
In total, disease environment may have aﬀected development through three distinct channels.
First, the geographic view of development predicts a direct eﬀect of disease on income that is
common to all countries. Second, geography may also have direct eﬀects on institutions or "cul-
ture." Third, the colonial origins theory predicts an eﬀect of disease environment on institutional
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⇒ Institutions ⇒ Income
Since the eﬀect of colonization policies on development is present only in former colonies, it is
necessary to show that endowments did aﬀect development diﬀerently across former colonies and
non-colonized nations. Figure 1 displays two scatter plots relating a simple measure of geography
— average temperature from Parker (1997) — to the 1996-to-2004 average of the "rule of law" from
Kaufmann et al. (2005), a measure of institutional outcomes. The score for the rule of law is
standardized and measured on a continuous scale, and higher values are associated with better
outcomes. The upper scatter plot presents this relation for countries that have not been colonized.
The lower scatter plot presents the same relation for former colonies. Graphical inspection suggests
that there is a negative relation between temperature and the rule of law in the group of former
colonies but not in the rest of the sample.
Table 2 formally establishes this observation. In Table 2 and the remainder of this study, the
sample consist of all 151 countries in the world that have an available score for the rule of law
in Kaufmann et al. (2005), an available 2003 GDP per capita estimate (not PPP adjusted) in
the Worldbank’s Development Indicators, and a population of more than 500,000. A country is
classiﬁed as a former colony if it ever has either been an oﬃcial colony, was under the complete
c o n t r o lo fa ne m p i r e - a ﬃliated organization such as the Dutch and British East Indies Companies,
had the status of protectorate of a non-adjacent empire, or lost sovereignty over its foreign policy
following a military conﬂict with a non-adjacent empire. This deﬁnition classiﬁes 95 countries as
former colonies and 56 as countries that have never been colonized ("non-colonies").
93 Identifying the Channels of Development
In Column 1 of Table 2, I regress the score for the rule of law on the standardized average
temperature in the sample of former colonies, and I repeat the same estimation in the non-
colonies in Column 2. While the relation between temperature and the score for the rule of law
is signiﬁcant and negative in the sample of former colonies, it is positive and insigniﬁcant in the
sample of non-colonies.
Temperature is not the only variable that had a diﬀerential eﬀect on development. Columns
3 and 4 document that the correlation of average rainfall and the rule of law is signiﬁcantly
positive in the group of non-colonies, while there is only a very weak correlation between these
two variables in the group of former colonies. Average rainfall is deﬁned as the standardized sum
of minimum plus maximum monthly rainfall from Parker (1997).
Also, the inﬂuence of average elevation on institutional development is signiﬁcant in the group
of non-colonies, while this is not the case in the rest of the world. The reverse is true for "tem-
perature at maximum humidity," a measure that is low under cold and moist climate conditions.
For the case of temperature at maximum humidity, the coeﬃcients in the two groups of countries
are even of opposite signs. Both average elevation and temperature at maximum humidity are
standardized and come from Parker (1997).
Last, in Columns 9 and 10 of Table 2, I document that also malaria had a diﬀerential eﬀect
on development. Malaria Ecology is constructed by Kiszewski et al. (2004) and measures the
geographic potential for the disease. The correlation between the geographic potential for malaria
is signiﬁcant and negative in the group of former colonies, and the coeﬃcient is estimated at −0.27.
In the group of non-colonies, the coeﬃcient is estimated at −0.18 and is not signiﬁcant.
Many aspects of geography did aﬀect development in one group of countries, yet not in the
rest of the sample. This diﬀerence in how endowments have shaped development can only be
rationalized by the role that endowments played in shaping colonization policies.
I next show how the diﬀerential impact of geography can be exploited to estimate the partial
eﬀects of institutions and endowments on income. Let Yi denote the logarithm of GDP per
capita and denote the measure of institutional quality in country i by Ri. Denote the measure
10of geographic endowments by Ei, and denote the measure summarizing European colonization
policies by Si. Last, the dummy Ci equals 1 for former colonies and 0 otherwise. Abstracting
from covariates, the joint model of colonization, institutions, and income is given by
Yi = e λY +e δY Ci + e αRi + e ηY Ei + e νY,i (1)
Ri = e λR +e δRCi + e ηREi + e βYi + Cie θRSi + e νR,i (2)
Si = e λS +e θSEi + e νS,i (3)
where (3) applies only to former colonies.
A country’s institutions and income level depend on endowments through three potential chan-
nels. First, endowments may directly aﬀect technology and income. This channel is measured by
e ηY in Equation (1). Second, the analysis allows for a potential direct eﬀect of endowments on
institutions, measured by e ηR in Equation (2). The latter channel accounts for the possibility that
the organization of society and therefore, the quality of institutions, depends directly on climate,
disease, and other endowments. Third, the theories relating institutional origin to colonial expe-
rience predict that endowments aﬀect colonization policies and, therefore, institutional outcomes
in former colonies. The institution-building eﬀect of endowments in former colonies is measured
by e θS in (3).
Equation (3) is a reduced-form relation measuring the combined impact of the colonizer iden-
tity and on the adopted colonization policies. Implicit in Equation (1) is the assumption that
these colonization policies did not inﬂuence income per capita directly. I document below that
colonization policies did not directly aﬀect growth via the accumulation of human capital, as is
argued by Glaeser et al. (2004).
With these three distinct eﬀects in mind, consider an estimation of the reduced form of (1),
(2), and (3) in a sample composed of former colonies such that Ci =1for all observations. In the
estimation of Equation (2) in such a sample, the coeﬃcient of endowments could be signiﬁcant
either because colonization policies were aﬀected by endowments (e θSe θR), because endowments
have a direct eﬀect on institutions (e ηR), or because endowments directly impact income, which
in turn aﬀects institutions (e βe ηY ).
11The same reasoning applies when trying to disentangle institutions and income in the (second
stage) estimation of Equation (1). The eﬀect of institutions on income could be overstated because
the restriction that endowments do not directly aﬀect development (e ηY =0 ) is needed to identify
the system. Due to this restriction, all of the correlation between endowments and income is
attributed to the institutional channel, and the coeﬃcient of instrumented institutional quality in
(1) is biased if geography also has a direct eﬀect on income.
In contrast, consider an estimation of the reduced form of (1), (2), and (3) in a sample including
non-colonized nations.6
Yi = λY + λ0
Y Ci + αb Ri + ηY Ei + vY,i (4)
b Ri = λR + λ0
RCi + ηREi + θR (EiCi)+νR,i (5)
The interpretation of the coeﬃcients in the reduced-form estimation of institutional quality in
(5) is as follows. ηR captures the direct eﬀect that geography has on institutional development,
while θR captures the institution-building eﬀect of endowments, which is exclusively present in
former colonies. θR in Equation (5) tests the joint hypothesis that endowments aﬀected European
settlement policies, European settlement policies aﬀected early institutions, and early institutions
persist until today.
The ﬁrst-stage estimation of the reduced form model in (5) includes the main eﬀect of endow-
ments, a colony dummy, as well as the interaction of these two variables. Since the additional
variation in the group of non-colonized countries pins down the coeﬃcient for the direct impact
of endowments on development, the estimation can disentangle the relation between institutions
and income.
6The following relations hold between the coeﬃcients in (1), (2), and (3) and in (5) and (4): ϑR = h ϑR/

1 − h αh β

,
θR = h θRh θS/

1 − h αh β

and ϑY = i ϑY /

1 − h αh β

.F u r t h e r m o r e ,νRi =





1 − h αh β

demonstrating
that there may be heterscedasticity between the two groups of countries. All results presented below are thus
estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
124T h e P a r t i a l E ﬀects of Endowments and Institutions
In this section, I present the main result of this paper. In Table 3, I exploited the diﬀerential
eﬀect of single geographic variables to identify the relation between endowments, institutions, and
income. In Table 4, I use a more extensive model of endowments, estimate the partial eﬀects of
institutions and endowments, and present some robustness tests.
Table 3 presents the relation between geography, institutions, and income. I use the 2003
GDP per capita estimates from the Worldbank Development Indicators (not PPP adjusted) to
measure income. Panel A displays the ﬁrst stage estimation relating geography to institutional
quality, and Panel B displays the second stage estimation relating endowments, instrumented
institutional quality, and income.
Columns 1 to 3 highlight the methodology of this paper. In all three models, the independent
variable is average temperature. In Column 1, I present the raw correlation between this measure
and the logarithm of GDP per capita (Panel B) and the rule of law (Panel A) in the group of
former colonies. In Column 2, I reproduce the same regression for the group of non-colonized
countries. While average temperature is highly co r r e l a t e dw i t hb o t hi n s t i t u t i o n sa n di n c o m ei n
the sample of former colonies, this is not the case in the sample of non-colonized nations.
Column 3 exploits the diﬀerential impact of temperature to identify the relation between
institutions and income. The sample includes all 151 countries, and in the ﬁrst stage, I introduce
the interaction of average temperature and a dummy that equals 1 for former colonies. In the
ﬁrst stage in Panel A, the interaction coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant and equal to −0.57, the diﬀerence
between the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcients in Columns 1 and 2.
The restriction identifying the relation between institutions and income assumes that the
diﬀerence in how temperature aﬀected development is exclusively driven by institutional outcomes.
The instrumented rule of law in Panel B is highly signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient is estimated at
1.92; i.e., a one standard deviation diﬀerence in the rule of law is associated with a roughly seven-
fold diﬀerence in income per capita.7 Up to rounding, this coeﬃcient equals the diﬀerence in how
7The instrumental variable varies only in the group of former colonies. The coeﬃcient of 1.92 should, thus, be
interpreted as the causal relation between the rule of law and income within the group of former colonies. The
relation between these two variables, however, might be diﬀerent for the rest of the sample.
13temperature aﬀected income per capita in the two groups of countries divided by the diﬀerence
in how temperature aﬀected institutional outcomes in the two groups of countries.
Column 3 also documents that temperature does not have a sizeable direct impact on devel-
opment. The total direct impact of average temperature estimation is equal to the sum of the
direct eﬀect of temperature on income plus the direct eﬀect of temperature on institutions times
the eﬀect of institutions on income. At the bottom of Table 3, I report the point estimate for
the total eﬀect of temperature on income — 0.11 log points in Column 3 — and a corresponding
standard error. The latter information is computed from a reduced-form estimation of income
per capita on average temperature, a colony dummy, and the interaction of the two.
I apply the same methodology using average rainfall in Column 4, humidity at maximum
temperature in Column 5, average elevation in Column 6, and Malaria Ecology in Column 7. The
interaction coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level in all but one case (Column 7) and is signiﬁcant
at the 1% level in three out of ﬁve cases. The point estimate for the importance of institutions
for the logarithm of income — with the exception of Column 7 where the instrument is weak — is
estimated to lie in the range of 1.54 and 2.26.
The evidence on the direct impact of endowments on prosperity is mixed. Though the direct
eﬀect of the geographic variable (in Panel B) on income for a given level of the rule of law is not
signiﬁcant in any of the regressions, in most cases, geography does have an eﬀect on institutions
also in countries that have not been colonized. The total eﬀect of geography on income — reported
at the bottom of Table 3 — is signiﬁcant for average rainfall, average elevation, and malaria
ecology. The size of the direct impact of geography is economically relevant and also comparable
in magnitude to the indirect impact of geography on colonization policies. For example, in the
model of Column 4, the interaction eﬀect of average rainfall is of the opposite sign and nearly
equal in magnitude to the main eﬀect.
In Table 4, I present a larger model of endowments that uses average temperature, average
elevation, and average rainfall to identify the determinants of development. The structure of
Table 4 mirrors the one of Table 3. Panel A presents the ﬁrst stage relating geography and
colonial history to institutional outcomes measured by the 1996-to-2004 average for the score of
the rule of law. Panel B presents the second-stage estimation relating institutional outcomes and
14endowments to income per capita diﬀerences.
In Column 1 of Table 4, I present the OLS relation between the three geographic variables
and the logarithm of 2003 GDP per capita. Next, in Column 2, I introduce the three interactions
in the ﬁrst-stage estimation, and I instrument for the rule of law in Panel B. I address several
robustness tests in the rest of Table 4.
What is the contribution of the direct and indirect impact of geography on colonization poli-
cies? Consider ﬁrst the main eﬀect of rainfall in the model of Column 2. For given colonization
policies, a one standard-deviation diﬀerence in average rainfall is associated with a 0.33 diﬀerence
in the rule of law and a direct eﬀect on income per capita of -0.04 log points. For given coloniza-
tion policies, a one standard-deviation diﬀerence of average temperature is thus associated with a
diﬀerence in income per capita of 0.59 (0.33*1.92-0.04) log points. This compares to the indirect
eﬀect of average temperature on colonization policies and thus income per capita of 0.32 times
1.92, or 0.61 log points.
A similar calculation implies that a one standard deviation diﬀerence in temperature is asso-
ciated with a direct eﬀect on income per capita of 0.22 log points, while the indirect colonization
eﬀect is associated with a diﬀerence of 1.88 log points. Last, a one standard deviation diﬀerence
in elevation is associated with a direct eﬀect of 0.89 log points and an indirect institution building
eﬀect of 0.12 log points.
Table 4 highlights the fact that geographic endowments and institutions are both important
forces of development. In the model of Column 2, for a given level of endowments, a one standard-
deviation diﬀerence in institutions is associated with a diﬀerence in income per capita of 1.92 log
points. For given colonial history, a one standard-deviation diﬀerence in all three endowments
(higher temperature, lower elevation, and higher rainfall) is associated with a diﬀerence in income
p e rc a p i t ao f1 . 8 0l o gp o i n t s .
In both Panel A and Panel B, it is important to note that the signiﬁcance levels of the
single variables convey limited information because the three measures of geography are highly
collinear. At the bottom of Table 4, I present the Anderson Canonical Correlation statistic testing
for the joint signiﬁcance of the three instruments (three geographic variables interacted with the
colony dummy) and, therefore, weak identiﬁcation. This test is rejected at the 5% level in all
15speciﬁcations of Table 4, and it is rejected at the 1% level in seven out of the eight two-stage least
square estimations.
I also report a Wald test corresponding to the null hypothesis that the direct eﬀect of all three
geographic variables equals zero. The latter test is computed from a reduced-form estimation of
income per capita on the three measures of geography, a colony dummy, and the three interactions.
This statistic tests whether endowment aﬀected developments also conditional on a country’s
colonization experience. The joint test that the eﬀects of rainfall, temperature and elevation all
equal zero is rejected at the 0.1% level in all estimations.
I present several robustness tests from Column 3 onwards. An initial concern might be that
the inclusion of African countries, which have very low scores for the rule of law and an adverse
geography, is solely responsible for these ﬁndings. In Column 3, I hence exclude all African
countries from the estimation.
A second concern might be that, among the group of former colonies, the four rich European
oﬀshoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA) are driving the diﬀerential impact of
disease. I thus exclude these countries in Column 4.
Instead of excluding former colonies, in Column 5, I exclude the 20 former members of the
Warsaw Pact (six Eastern European countries and 14 countries that were part of the Soviet Union)
since these countries could be seen as "Russian Colonies." This sample yields the only speciﬁcation
where the test of weak identiﬁcation is not rejected at the 1% level, but it is rejected at the 5%
level.
Geography and economic outcomes vary widely across the diﬀerent continents. To docu-
ment that the results presented so far are not the result of the variation of endowments between
continents, but rather the result of the within-continent variation of endowments and economic
outcomes, I include continent dummies in Column 6.
Because colonization may be endogenous to early economic development, the colony dummy
itself has no economic interpretation. The fact that colonization is endogenous, however, is not a
source of bias for the other coeﬃcients as long as the true relation between economic development
and geography is linear. The endogeneity of colonization could be a source of bias if the relation
between endowments and development is nonlinear. For example, the average of the "average
16rainfall" variable is 0.17 in the group of former colonies, while it is −0.29 i nt h er e s to ft h e
sample. Correspondingly, a positive interaction eﬀect could also result from a relation between
rainfall and prosperity that is weaker for higher values of rainfall.
Iu s et w od i ﬀerent strategies to address this possible non-linearity. First, in Column 7, I include
square terms for the three geographic variables. These variables are constructed by subtracting
the minimum observed value of each variable and then squaring the result.
For reasons of brevity, the coeﬃcients are not reported in Table 4. In the ﬁrst stage estimation
in Column 7, the coeﬃcients (standard errors) are 0.055 (0.095) for average temperature squared,
0.06 (0.046) for average elevation squared and 0.073 (0.059) for average rainfall squared. A joint
test of signiﬁcance for the three variables is rejected at the 10% level. The interaction coeﬃcients
remain signiﬁcant.
For the case of average temperature and average rainfall, the absolute size of the interaction
coeﬃcient increases when the squared main eﬀects are added. In these two cases, the square eﬀect
is of the opposite sign as the interaction eﬀect, implying that even if the data exhibits a non-
linearity, it would tend to bias tends the interaction coeﬃcients towards zero, thus underestimating
the importance of the institution-building eﬀect on colonization.
Next, in Column 8, I restrict the sample so that the range of observed values for the indepen-
dent variables is the same as in the group of non-colonized nations and in the group of former
colonies.8 For example, the maximum of average annual temperature in the group of non-colonies
is 1.28, and I exclude the two former colonies that have an average temperature higher than 1.28.
In total, I exclude 35 countries following this methodology.
For the model with restricted variation of the independent variables of Column 8, I ﬁnd that all
three interaction coeﬃcients become larger in magnitude when the sample variation is restricted
by the independent variable. Therefore, I conclude that even if the relation between endowments
and prosperity is non-linear, the nonlinearity tends to bias the interaction coeﬃcients towards
zero in a linear model, thus underestimating the importance of the institution-building eﬀect on
colonization.
Two further robustness checks are presented in Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 document that the
8This selection by the independent variable is not to be confused with selection by the dependent variable.
17results are robust to using other measures of institutional quality. The two alternative measures
for institutions are the 1996 to 2004 average of "Control of Corruption" and of the "Quality of
Government" from Kaufmann et al. (2005). Both measures can be well explained by colonial
experience (Panel A) and both measures are signiﬁcant predictors of economic outcomes (Panel
B).
Next, I examine the identiﬁcation restriction of this study in more detail. As is argued by
Glaeser et al. (2004), colonizers could also have shaped prosperity via inﬂuencing the accumulation
of human capital directly. I address their criticism in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 5.
In Column 3, I add a second endogenous variable to the estimation, the percentage of the total
population (measured from 0 to 100) having attained high school from Barro and Lee (2000). Since
the rule of law and education are highly collinear, the ﬁrst stage partial R-squares are low, and
the estimation is not well identiﬁed (i.e. weak) in Column 3.
In Column 4, I thus enlarge the model and add the interactions of "variation of rainfall" and
"high humidity at maximum temperature" with a colony dummy. Variation of rainfall equals the
standardized square of maximum minus minimum monthly rainfall. In Column 5, I then add the
percentage of the population that has attained high school to the estimation. In this enlarged
model, both the rule of law and the measure of education are well explained by the set of ﬁve
instruments (see Panel A).
Column 5, Panel B, documents that the level of education induced by colonization has no
eﬀect on development conditional on the rule of law. The coeﬃcient of high school attendance is
far from signiﬁcant. In contrast, the estimated coeﬃcient for the rule of law is signiﬁcantly and
also aﬀected relatively little when human capital is added to the estimation (compare Column 4
to Column 5).
This result does not imply that human capital does not matter. I merely documents that
human capital is the result of the institutions induced by colonization and not a direct consequence
of colonization (also see Gallego (2003)). This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in Column 6, which adds an
alternative measures of education as endogenous variables, the percentage of "primary school
attained" in the total population in 1995 from Barro and Lee (2000).
I conclude that while the precise channels through which colonization has shaped institutions
18are somewhat unclear, colonization policies do not seem not to have contributed to income directly,
hence supporting the identiﬁcation assumption used in this study.
5 Disease and Development
The previous section demonstrates that both institutions and endowments matter for develop-
ment, but it does not oﬀer an interpretation of the precise mechanism at work. This section ﬁrst
develops a measure of the geographic potential for disease and then documents that disease is the
major channel through which endowments have shaped colonization policies. I also highlight the
fact that disease environment has a sizeable direct impact on prosperity.
5.1 The Geographic Potential for Disease
This section constructs measures of the geographic potential for disease, which I term "Early Dis-
ease Environment" (EDE). I construct this measure following a two-step methodology developed
by Kiszewski et al. (2004), who instrument for the prevalence of malaria with the geographic
potential for the disease. EDE is constructed by ﬁrst estimating the relation between the settler
mortality rates from Acemoglu et al. (2001) and a set of geographic variables that are ex ante
likely to be correlated with disease. Second, I predict the estimated model to a sample of 151
countries.
The empirical strategy of this section is motivated by two arguments. First,
"[s]ettler mortality measures the disease environment as European settlers arrived and
thereby provides an exogenous indicator of "germs""
(Easterly and Levine (2003), p. 12).
This exogenous indicator of germs is well suited to estimating the direct and the indirect
eﬀects of disease.
Second, it is straightforward to enlarge the sample of Acemoglu et al. (2001). Ultimately,
the natural prevalence of disease is a consequence of a country’s climate and landscape. One can
estimate the relation between geography and disease by using the mortality rates collected from
19historical sources and a set of geographic variables. The estimated relation between germs and
geography can then be used to construct a measure of early disease environment using the widely
available geographic information.
In Column 1 of Table 6, I present a simple model of geography and mortality. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of the settler mortality rate collected by Acemoglu et al. (2001).9
The independent variables are average annual temperature, minimum monthly rainfall, and max-
imum monthly rainfall from Parker (1997). Warmer climate and areas with pronounced dry (low
minimum monthly rain) or wet seasons (high maximum monthly rain) are characterized by high
mortality rates. All three regressors are signiﬁcant, and I also report the p-value corresponding
to the joint null-hypothesis that the included geographic variables together do not matter for
mortality. I reject this null hypothesis at the 0.1% signiﬁcance level in all regressions of Table 6.
In Column 2, I enlarge the geographic model of disease10 and add dummies that equal one
if a country has natural incidence of savanna, natural incidence of either temperate grassland
or temperate forest, is characterized by Mediterranean climate, or has mountains. I also add a
measure of the average temperature at maximum humidity. All variables are from Parker (1997).
With the exception of the mountain dummy, all added variables are signiﬁcant.
Is the selection of the geographic variables in Column 2 exhaustive? I next add distance from
the equator (Column 3) and the fraction of the population living in temperate areas (KGPTEMP
from Mellinger et al. (2000), Column 4) to the estimation. On the basis of the information in the
previous model, these two variables are not signiﬁcant predictors of mortality, and the F-score of
the model decreases when including these variables.
The settler mortality data of Acemoglu et al. (2001) has been criticized by Albouy (2008),11
who argues that the mortality rates are not comparable because they are sampled from diﬀerent
populations. In Column 5, I control for the sampling population and add three dummies that
9In Table 3, Malta and the Bahamas are missing because their population is smaller than 500,000. See sampling
criterion above.
10In most speciﬁcations of Table 3, maximum monthly rainfall is not signiﬁcant; however, this is symptomatic
of the high degree of collinearity between the minimum and maximum rainfall. Inclusion of maximum rainfall
improves the total ﬁt of the model considerably.
11An earlier version of Albouy’s work also criticizes the mortality rates collected by Acemoglu et al. (2001).
The working paper of this study also constructs a measure of Early Disease Environment using Albouy’s revised
mortality series, with results identical to the ones presented below.
20respectively equal one if the mortality rate was sampled from soldiers in a campaign, from bishops,
or from forced laborers. Indeed, the population the data were sampled from has a sizeable inﬂuence
on mortality. Compared to the omitted group — soldiers stationed in barracks — soldiers in a
campaign are Exp[0.71] ≈ 2 times as likely to die from disease. Also forced laborers are more
likely to die from disease, whereas bishops faced a slightly lower mortality rate. I also report
the p-value corresponding to the joint null-hypothesis that these three population dummies equal
zero, which is always rejected at the 5% level.
Using the estimated relation between geography and settler mortality in Table 6, I next predict
several measures of the geographic potential for disease in 151 countries. In the analysis below,
I refer to this measure as "Early Disease Environment," or EDE. Paralleling the deﬁnition of
"settler mortality" in Acemoglu et al. (2001), EDE refers to the logarithm of the annualized
probability of death for European males in the age cohort of soldiers.
It is important to note that the use of EDE — measuring the hypothetical mortality rate rather
than the actual one — is in accordance with the institution-building hypothesis of Acemoglu et al.
(2001), who provide evidence that knowledge about the widespread prevalence of disease alone
was enough to deter migration to a colony.
The main measure of disease environment in this paper is taken from predicting the model
of Column 5 in Table 6. The estimation takes into account the sampling population, and when
predicting, I partial out the population dummies. Since soldiers stationed in barracks are the
omitted group, EDE measures the potential annual mortality of a soldier stationed in barracks
for all countries of the sample.
Table 7 presents summary statistics and a pair-wise correlation diagram for the mortality
series of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Albouy (2006), the constructed measures of Early Disease
Environment, the 1996-2004 average of the score for Rule of Law from Kaufmann et al. (2004), and
income per capita. The measures of Early Disease Environment are predicted using the models
of Table 6. If appropriate, the sampling population has been partialled out when predicting the
measure of disease environment. For the sample criterion see above.
215.2 The Colonial Origins of Institutions
In this section, I demonstrate that institutional outcomes have been strongly inﬂuenced by early
disease environment in former colonies, yet not at all in the rest of the world. This diﬀerential
eﬀect of disease on development can only be rationalized in the context of the theory of the
colonial origins of development put forward by Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Figure 3 displays the relation between disease environment and institutional outcomes, mea-
sured by the rule of law from Kaufmann et al. (2005), where a higher value corresponds to better
enforcement of laws. In the lower scatterplot of Figure 3, I display the relation between the geo-
graphic measure of settler mortality and institutions for former colonies, reproducing Acemoglu
et al.’s (2001) basic ﬁnding of a strong negative correlation between these two variables in former
colonies. In the upper scatterplot of Figure 3, I display the same relation, but for the group of
non-colonized nations. Graphical inspection suggests that there is no negative relation between
the two variables.
Table 8 establishes this diﬀerential eﬀect of geography formally. Columns 1 to 4 serve to doc-
ument that the proposed strategy of directly instrumenting for institutions with the constructed
measure of early disease environment. Columns 5 to 7 then establish the main result of this
section, while Column 8 presents a key robustness test.
Consider ﬁrst the upper Panel B of Table 8. In all speciﬁcations the dependent variable is the
1996 to 2004 average of the score for the rule of law. In Column 1, I repeat the basic speciﬁcation
of Acemoglu et al. (2001) for the 62 countries of their sample that fulﬁll this paper’s sample
criterion. The relation between the standardized settler mortality rate and the score for rule of
law is highly signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient is economically large. In Table 8, I have standardized
the historical mortality rate of Acemoglu et al. (2001). A one standard deviation diﬀerence
in settler mortality is associated with a 0.587 standard deviation diﬀerence in the Rule of Law.
Furthermore, this single variable can explain more than 43% of the variation in institutional
outcomes.
In next instrument for the mortality rate from historical sources with geographic variables in
Column 2 and with the main measure of Early Disease Environment (EDE) in Column 3. In
22Column 2, I instrument for mortality with the geographic variables introduced in the previous
section. I use the variables from the large model of Early Disease Environment in Column 3 of
Table 6. The ﬁrst stage regression is identical to Column 3 of Table 6, and I therefore do not
report the ﬁrst stage in Panel A of Table 8. The instrumented mortality rate is again highly
signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient is economically large.12
In Column 3, I again I instrument for the historical mortality rate directly with Early Disease
Environment (EDE). This measure is predicted (from Column 5 in Table 6) partialling out the
sampling population dummies, and it is thus no longer possible to instrument for mortality with
the geographical variables directly. While adjusting for the sampling population made a substan-
tial diﬀerence for the model of disease (compare Columns 2 and 5 of Table 6), accounting for this
diﬀerence does not change the relation between mortality and institutional outcomes. Again, the
instrumented mortality rate is a highly signiﬁcant determinant of institutions, and the coeﬃcient
is comparable with the one in the OLS regressions in Column 1.
Instead of instrumenting for the historical mortality rate, I next estimate a reduced form
equation in Column 4 that relates early disease environment to institutional outcomes directly.
This regression tests the joint hypothesis that EDE is a signiﬁcant determinant of colonization
policies, and that settlement policies is a signiﬁcant determinant of institutional outcomes. The
coeﬃcient of -0.609 is equal to the product of the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient of 0.879 and the second
stage coeﬃcient of -0.693 in Column 3.13 I next evaluate this relation in the group of additional
former colonies that are not part of the sample of Acemoglu et al. (2001) in Column 5. Also for
the 33 additional colonies there is a strong negative relation between Early Disease Environment.
I next turn to the main result of this section in Columns 6 to 8 of Table 8. In Column 6,
I document that there is a strong relation between early disease environment and institutional
outcomes for the 95 former colonies in my sample. Next, in Column 7, I document that there is
only a very weak relation between the same two variables in the 56 non-colonized countries.
Is this diﬀerence in how early disease environment aﬀected development statistically signiﬁ-
12For both (2) and (3), I do however report the Cragg-Donald (1993) F statistic and the Stock-Yogo (2005)
critical value for underidentiﬁcation.
13Since the underlying geographic information is diﬀerent for all 62 countries and there is no extrapolated infor-
maiton anymore, the number of clusters is now equal to 62.
23c a n t ?I nC o l u m n8 ,Ia l l o wf o rad i ﬀerential eﬀect of early disease environment in these two groups
of countries by adding an interaction term of EDE and a dummy that equals 1 for former colonies.
This interaction is highly signiﬁcant, and since the main eﬀect is equal to the coeﬃcient of -0.022
in Column 7, the interaction coeﬃcient is equal to -0.543 (up to rounding equal to -0.566+0.022).
The full model in Column 8 establishes that early disease environment had a very strong
impact on institutional outcomes in former coloni e s ,y e tn o ti nt h er e s to ft h ew o r l d .T h i sc a nb e
rationalized in the context of the theory of Acemoglu et al. (2001), yet one immediate robustness
test is in order.
A potential concern with this outcome is that colonization is endogenous and therefore the
coeﬃcient of EDE or the interaction is biased. This is not the case, since the estimation of these
two coeﬃcients only uses the within group (colony and non-colony) variation of EDE and economic
outcomes. If indeed, the true relationship of the direct eﬀect of geography and indirect eﬀect of
settler mortality are both linear, then, even if the selection into these two groups is endogenous the
estimated coeﬃcients are unbiased. The results presented so far, however, could be an artefact of a
nonlinear relation between disease and economic outcomes. As can easily be made out from Figure
3, former colonies are on average characterized by high levels of settler mortality. Correspondingly,
a positive interaction θR could also have resulted from the fact that the relation between disease
and prosperity is stronger for higher values of early disease environment. I document that this is
not the case in the next section.
This section demonstrates that there is a strong diﬀerential relation between disease end
development, which can only be rationalized in the context of the theory of the colonial origins
brought forward by Acemoglu et al. (2001). The next section estimates the partial eﬀects of
geography and institutions on development.
5.3 Disease, Institutions, and Prosperity
In this section, I show that institutions and geography are both signiﬁcant and economically rele-
vant determinants of development. Second, I reconcile the conﬂicting results of the two literatures
arguing for the importance of either institutions or geography. Both theories are valid, yet they
both overestimate the importance of their starting hypothesis since they restrict the other channel
24of development to equal 0.
In Table 9, I display the relation between early disease environment, institutions and income
diﬀerences. The structure of Table 9 is the following. In Columns 1 to 4, I adopt the view
that early disease environment only matters for development through its impact on institutional
development. Next, In Columns 5 and 6, I adopt the rivaling view that disease environment
only matters for development through its direct impact income. Finally, in Column 7 I reconcile
these two views, and I show how much of the correlations between early disease environment and
development can be attributed to either channel.
In Columns 1 and 2, I instrument for institutions with settler mortality and then Early Disease
Environment. The upper Panel B of Table 9 presents the second stage relation between instru-
mented institutional outcomes and income, and the lower Panel A presents the relation between
germs and institutional outcomes. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the logarithm of 2003
GDP per capita and in Panel A, the dependent variable is the 1996 to 2004 score of the rule of
law.
In Column 1, I present the basic instrumental variable regression for the 62 countries of
Acemoglu et al. (2001) that are part of the sample of this paper. In Column 2, I repeat this
regression for the same set of countries, but I instrument for institutional outcomes with EDE
instead of the logarithm of the mortality. In Column 3, I add all former colonies of the sample. In
all Columns 1, 2, and 3, institutions are highly signiﬁcant determinants of development. Moreover,
the estimated eﬀect is very large and comparable to the results of Acemoglu et al. (2001). In
Column 4, I estimate the same speciﬁcation, but for the sample of non-colonized nations. The
instrument has no power in this group, and the estimation thus predicts a huge coeﬃcient of
institutions that is far from signiﬁcant.
I present the second stage equation in Panel B of Table 9. Paralleling the speciﬁcations in the
preceding section, I ﬁrst estimate Equation (4) using the settler mortality rate from Acemoglu et
al. (2001) as the instrument for institutions (Column 1), then, I repeat the estimation in the same
sample but with EDE as instrument (Column 2). In Column 3, I still use EDE as the instrument
for the rule of law, however I enlarge the sample to encompass all 95 former colonies. Finally,
in Column 4, I estimate the relationship for the sample of non-colonies. While the instrumented
25institutional quality rate is highly signiﬁcant determinant of development, this is not at all the
case in the group of non-colonies.
The speciﬁcations of Columns 1 to 4 identify the relation between institutions and income by
the restriction that the only channel through which germs and disease matter for development
is indirectly via their impact on institutional development. Since settler mortality rates are
actually a measure of the natural prevalence of disease, the mortality rate and the measure of
early disease environment are very well suited to test for the direct impact disease environment
has on development. In addition to being measured exogenously mortality rates are also highly
relevant, since after all, a low level of health is associated with tremendous direct consequences
on prosperity. In Columns 5 and 6, I thus adopt a diﬀerent view of development and assume that
the only way in which early disease environment has inﬂuenced development is via its impact on
current prevalence of disease and income levels.
In Column 5, I thus directly regress income on EDE using the full sample of 151 countries.
This regression is in the logic of the "geographic" view of development since for the direct impact
of development it should not matter whether a country has been colonized or not. The coeﬃcient
of EDE is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Again, this economically very large: a one standard
deviation diﬀerence in early disease environment is associated with a 0.943 log points (2 and a
half fold) diﬀerence in income per capita. In Column 6, I show that the same ﬁnding is when
adding a colony dummy, and the coeﬃcient is estimated at .
The model of Column 7 reconciles these two views of development and disentangles the two
channels of development. I estimate the full model of Equation (4). In the ﬁrst stage estimation
(Panel A), I include EDE, a colony dummy, and the interaction of the colony dummy with EDE.
The IV estimation in Panel B includes the instrumented rule of law, EDE and a colony dummy.
In this speciﬁcations the exclusion restriction in the instrumental variable speciﬁc a t i o n si st h a t
the interaction term of the colony dummy times the measure of disease environment only aﬀects
institutions and has no further direct eﬀects on income.
The two main questions of this section are whether the instrumented institutional quality is a
signiﬁcant determinant of income and whether there is an additional eﬀect disease environment
has on income. Only if the latter is not the case, the settler mortality variable used by Acemoglu
26et al. (2001) has no eﬀect other than through early institution building and is a valid instrument
for institutions. If, on the other side, ϑY is diﬀerent from 0,s o m eo ft h ee ﬀects the authors
attribute to the institutional channel is in fact a direct consequence of disease environment on
prosperity and therefore the importance of institutions is overstated.
First, I show that indeed the instrumented rule of law is an important determinant of economic
growth. Consider ﬁrst the separate second stage estimation for colonies and non-colonies in Panel
A of Table 9, Columns 3 and 4. As is to be expected from the results presented above, the
instrumented quality of institutions is highly signiﬁcant in the group of former colonies, while
this is not the case in the group of independent nations, where the instrument has no power.
For former colonies, the coeﬃcient of Rule of Law is highly signiﬁcant and estimated at 2.077.
Incorporating the ﬁrst stage results, for a former colony, a 1% lower rate of EDE is associated
with a 0.566 ∗ 2.077 = 1.18% higher income per capita.
I next examine the full model (4), where the estimation exploits the interaction of mortality
and a colony dummy instead of the relying on the main eﬀect of settler mortality to instrument
for institutions. Because the main eﬀect of mortality or disease environment is not used as
an instrument, I can test for a direct impact of germs on income levels in the second stage
estimation. The data conﬁrms Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) primary results that institutions are a
major determinant of development. The estimated coeﬃcient as well as the associated economic
importance are highly signiﬁcant: if a country where to improve its institutional score of Rule of
Law by one standard deviation, it is predicted to increase its income by a factor of 4.
While conﬁrming that institutions installed during colonization are a major determinant of
current prosperity, I also ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcients of the quality of institutions are
about one fourth smaller when using the interaction of disease and a colony dummy rather than
the main eﬀect of mortality to instrument for institutions. Comparing Columns 4 and 5, the
coeﬃcient of Rule of Law drops from 2.077 to 1.624.
Why is the importance of institutions smaller in the full sample than in an estimation restricted
to former colonies? Compare the models in Columns 3 and 7. In order to identify the system, the
speciﬁcation in Column 3 imposes the restriction that the direct coeﬃcient of disease environment
on income per capita ϑY is equal to 0. This restriction is not present in model Column 3 and
27mortality is estimated to have a direct eﬀect on incomes with a coeﬃcient of −0.256.
Consider ﬁrst a 1% decrease of settler mortality in a former colony in the full model of Equation
(4) including both independent nations and former colonies. In Column 7 of Panel A of Table 9,
a 1% lower mortality score is associated with an score of rule of law that is 0.00566 points higher,
where the total eﬀect is the sum of interaction (−0.00543)a n dm a i n( −0.0022)e ﬀect. In Column
7 of Panel A in Table 9, this improvement is associated with an indirect (institution building)
eﬀect of a 0.566 times 1.624% higher level of per capita income. In addition, the change of settler
mortality is associated with a direct increase of income levels by 0.256%, hence resulting in a total
1.18% increase of income for a 1% drop in mortality.
Consider the same 1% decrease of settler mortality in a former colony in the model including
only colonies from Column 3: a 1% lower score of mortality is again associated with an increase of
t h er u l eo fl a ws c o r eb y0.00566 points. However, because the direct eﬀect of mortality in Column
3 is restricted to equal 0, the estimation attributes all of the 1.18% GDP increase to changes of
institutional quality and hence estimates a coeﬃcient of 1.771, which - up to a rounding error
-s a t i s ﬁes 0.566 ∗ 2.077 = 0.566 ∗ 1.624 + 0.256. The importance of institutions is overstated by
around a fourth in the model that encompasses only former colonies because it wrongly attributes
the direct eﬀect geography has on income diﬀerence to the institutional channel.
T h es a m ek i n do fb i a si sp r e s e n tf o rt h es p e c i ﬁcations of Columns 5 and 6 that restrict the
indirect eﬀect of EDE to equal 0. Because all of the correlation between EDE and income is
attributed to the direct eﬀect, this estimation is biased.
While Acemoglu et al. (2001), and all papers that derive from them overstate the importance of
institutions, the geographic school of development overstates the direct eﬀect of the prevalence of
disease on economic outcomes. Consider next Column 7, where I take a geographic perspective of
development and argue that disease environment only aﬀects development directly. The regression
thus only includes the colony dummy and EDE. The coeﬃcient of EDE is estimated to be −0.8/ 8
whereas the estimation is only -0.26 in model Column 5. That is, because these papers. In
the next section, I examine whether also other variables such as Latitude, Malaria Ecology, or
KGTEMP suﬀer from this problem.
The ﬁnding that both channels of development matter represents the second ﬁnding of this
28paper. Because disease environment aﬀected both early institutions as well as income directly,
Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) speciﬁcations overestimate the importance of institutions. It is important
to point out that while the overall importance of settler mortality for economic prosperity remains
unchanged, the interpretation is diﬀerent.
In total, I conclude that while the eﬀect of the prevalence of disease on institutions is the
main factor for economic prosperity, the results are smaller than Acemoglu et al. (2001) predict
because disease environment has a direct eﬀect on development. Comparing the magnitude of
the two forces of economic development, I ﬁnd that about one fourth of the combined eﬀect of
disease environment on development is associated with direct eﬀects of development, while the
other three quarters are associated with the institution building channel of development.
One important robustness check is presented in Column 8 of Table 9. As can easily be made
out from Figure 2, former colonies are on average characterized by high levels of settler mortality.
Correspondingly, a positive interaction θR could also have resulted from the fact that the relation
between disease and prosperity is stronger for higher values of early disease environment. Thus,
I add a "EDE Square" term to the estimation. The regressor EDE Square equals EDE minus the
minimum observed value of EDE, and this diﬀerence is taken to the square.
In Column 8, the interaction coeﬃcient is changed little and is highly signiﬁcant. Moreover, the
coeﬃcient of EDE Square is positive, implying that the relation between disease environment and
institutions becomes weaker for high values of mortality. Even if the data exhibits a nonlinearity,
this would bias the interaction term of mortality towards being positive, yet not towards being
negative. Indeed, comparing the magnitude of the interaction coeﬃcient in Column 8 of Table
9 to the magnitude of the corresponding coeﬃcients in Column 7, the interaction eﬀect becomes
larger in absolute terms when a squared mortality regressor is added to the speciﬁcation. I have
also added higher order terms of mortality to the estimation, with identical results: taking the
second order condition of a third or fourth degree polynomial, the relation between mortality and
institutions becomes weaker rather than stronger over the range of observed values of mortality. I
conclude that the results presented so far are not the result of a non linear relation between EDE
and economic outcomes.
It has to be noted however that colonization is likely to be endogenous, and the colony dummy
29thus has no economic interpretation. In all speciﬁcations, since EDE is standardized and of mean
0, the colony dummy measures the average eﬀect of colonization (or selection bias) for a country
with average disease environment.
In total, I conclude that while the eﬀect of the prevalence of disease on institutions is the
main factor for economic prosperity, the results are smaller than Acemoglu et al. (2001) predict
because disease environment has a direct eﬀect on development. Comparing the magnitude of
the two forces of economic development, I ﬁnd that for a former colony, about one fourth of the
combined eﬀect of disease environment on development is associated with the direct impact of
disease, while the other three quarters are associated with the institution building channel.
I present some basic robustness checks in Table 10, where again the ﬁrst stage relation between
EDE and institutions is estimated in Panel A and the second stage relation between institutions
and income is presented in Panel B. Are the results driven by the inclusion of certain groups
of former colonies? A ﬁrst worry might be that inclusion of African and especially Sub-Saharan
countries — which have very low scores for the Rule of Law and an adverse disease environment — is
solely responsible for the ﬁndings presented so far. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10, I hence exclude
all African countries from the estimation. The exclusion of African countries does not weaken the
results, instead the interaction is larger and signiﬁcant at higher levels in this speciﬁcation.
A second worry might be that among the group of former colonies, the four rich "Neo-Europes"
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA) are driving the presented results. I thus exclude
these countries in Columns 3 and 4. Instead of excluding former colonies, in Columns 5 and 6,
I next exclude 20 former members of the Warsaw Pact (6 Eastern European members and 14 of
countries that were part of the Soviet Union. Germany is not counted as a former member of the
Warsaw Pact.). This is motivated since these countries have all been under communist regimes,
and they could thus be seen as "Russian Colonies." Again, excluding this group of countries
leads to a larger importance of institutions. Finally, I include continent dummies for Africa, the
Americas, Asia, and Oceania in Columns 7 and 8, again with unchanged ﬁndings.
306 Disease, Other Endowments, and Development
In this section, I check whether geographic endowments do have a signiﬁcant impact on develop-
ment also conditional on disease. This is in order, since "geography" is in essence a black box that
is often proxied with vague measures such as latitude or the fraction of the population living in
temperate areas. But do these measures correlate with growth because they are correlated with
disease, correlated with labor productivity directly, or do they aﬀect growth through some other
channel?
There are two noteworthy ﬁndings. First, disease environment seems to be by far the most
important channel by which geography aﬀects development. Once the level of disease environment
is accounted for, variables that are often used as proxies for geography — distance from equator, a
"tropics" dummy, or the fraction of the population living in temperate areas — do not matter for
development. Second, however, variables that either measure an aspect of geography orthogonal to
disease environment (a landlocked dummy to measure transportation costs and a dummy for oil-
rich countries) or that measure a narrow and well deﬁned aspect of disease environment (malaria)
are signiﬁcant determinants of development also conditional on disease and institutions.
In Columns 1 to 3 of Table 11, I analyze the eﬀect of latitude. In Column 1, I ﬁrst show
that in a regression including only this measure and a colony dummy, there is a strong positive
correlation between how far a country is away from the equator and how rich it is. This correlation
vanishes once I control for disease and institutions in Column 2, but latitude is estimated to aﬀect
institutions. I ﬁnd no evidence that institutions have been aﬀected by latitude diﬀerentially in
former colonies and in the rest o ft h es a m p l e( s e eC o l u m n3 ) .
In Columns 4 to 6 of Table 11, I analyze the eﬀect of access to the open sea. The estimation
adds a landlocked dummy that equals one if a country does not have access to the open sea. Being
landlocked is associated with a lower income per capita (see Column 4) and this is also true when
controlling for institutions and disease (see Column 5). I ﬁnd no evidence that institutions have
been aﬀected by access to the open sea diﬀerentially in colonies and in other nations (see Column
6).
In Columns 1 to 3 of Table 12, I check whether oil abundance is a determinant of income also
31conditional on institutions and disease environment. The measure employed is a dummy that
equals 1 if Parker (1997) lists the country to have more that 50,000 barrels of proven oil reserves
per capita in 1994. Not surprisingly, oil rich countries are richer on average (see Column 1). This
is also true conditional on disease and institutions (see Column 2), and again, there is no evidence
that resource abundance has aﬀected develop diﬀerentially in former colonies as opposed to in the
rest of the world (see Column 3).
In Columns 4 to 6 of Table 12, I analyze the relation between the fraction of the population
living in temperate areas — the measure "KGPTEMP" from Mellinger et al. (2000) — and economic
outcomes. In a speciﬁcation that includes a colony dummy and this measure, there is a strong
positive relation between the fraction of the population living in temperate areas and GDP per
capita. This relation vanishes once I control for disease and institutions in Column 5, and the
coeﬃcient of KGPTEMP is even estimated positive. Last, I check whether this variable had a
diﬀerential eﬀect in former colonies and non-colonized nations, which is not the case.
In Table 13, I check for the inﬂuence that average temperature and the maximum of monthly
rainfall have on economic outcomes. I ﬁnd that the raw correlation between temperature and
income is negative in Column 1 and that the same is true for maximum monthly rainfall (see
Column 4). However, this negative correlation vanishes once I control for disease (see Columns 2
and 5, respectively). Also, I ﬁnd that these two variables have not aﬀected economic outcomes
diﬀerentially in former colonies and in other nations (see Columns 3 and 6).
What is the interpretation of the results of Table 13? The variables are also used in the
construction of Early Disease Environment, and the interpretation of the coeﬃcients in Columns
2 and 5 is thus the following. Both higher average temperature and higher maximum rain tend to
cause higher prevalence of germs and disease, which is strongly detrimental for growth. However,
conditional on the level of disease, these two measurers are not detrimental to growth. In the
case of average temperature, the coeﬃcient is nearly signiﬁcantly positive, which seems reasonable
since warmer climate is associated with better crops and living conditions.
In Table 14, I analyze the eﬀect of Malaria Ecology (ME) from Kiszewski et al. (2004) and
a dummy for countries that are located in the tropics. In Column 1, I regress the logarithm of
GDP per capita in 2003 on standardized ME and a colony dummy. A one standard deviation
32diﬀerence in ME is associated with a 0.7 log points lower GDP per capita. In Column 2, I add
the instrumented rule of law and EDE to the estimation. The coeﬃcient of ME is still signiﬁcant,
y e ti td r o p sf r o m0.7 to 0.23.T h eﬁrst stage coeﬃcient of ME on the rule of law is even estimated
positive.
Malaria could have had an additional eﬀect on the development of institutions in former
colonies since it may have aﬀected European settlement decisions. I demonstrate that this is not
the case in Column 3, where I add the interaction of malaria ecology with the colony dummy.
Doing so does not alter the results, and I thus conclude that malaria ecology indeed does have a
strong direct eﬀect on economic outcomes. For example, if it were possible to reduce the prevalence
of certain mosquito vectors in Nigeria to a level comparable to that of Neighboring Benin (from
2.62 to 2.01), this would be associated with a 15% increase in GDP per capita. Although the
coeﬃcients is much smaller than a simple regression would suggest, malaria is associated with a
large detrimental impact on economic development.
In contrast, being in the tropics is not per se associated with worse economic outcomes. The
eﬀect of a tropics dummy — equal to one if Parker (1997) lists the country to have either "Tropical
Wet" or "Tropical Dry/Wet" climate - is analyzed in Columns 4 to 6 of Table 14. In Column
4, I regress the tropics dummy and a colony dummy on the logarithm of GDP per capita in
2003. A country with tropical climate is 0.77 log points poorer. However, when I add the tropics
dummy to the IV estimation in Column 5, the same cannot be said: the dummy is far from being
signiﬁcant, and both the ﬁrst and the second stage coeﬃcients actually imply that countries in
the tropics have a higher level of development. In Column 6, I allow for the tropics dummy to
aﬀect development diﬀerentially in colonies and non-colonized nations, but I ﬁnd no evidence for
ad i ﬀerential eﬀect.
Tables 11 to 14 emphasize that the main channel through which geography aﬀects development
is via disease environment. The proxies that the literature has put forward to measure geography
are shown to matter because they are correlated with disease. Proxies for "geography" such
as latitude are not important for development once I control for EDE and institutional quality.
This should be expected, since it is not detrimental for growth to be close to equator. Rather,
being close to the equator is associated with warmer and moister climate, higher prevalence
33of disease, and therefore lower prosperity. In contrast, other measures such as a landlocked
dummy are important to explain development also conditional on early disease environment and
on institutional outcomes. Also this is as expected, since transportation costs should also matter
conditional on the potential for disease.
7 Robustness Analysis
In this section, I examine four sets of diﬀerent robustness tests. First, I show that the results
hold up to various alternative models of early disease environment. Second, I use alternative rules
to classify countries into the group of former colonies or former non-colonized nations. Third, I
show that the results of this paper also hold up when using the revised mortality series of Albouy
(2006). Fourth, I include a variety of sociological and historic controls and show that the results
presented so far also hold conditional on these variables. Fifth, I introduce further instruments
for institutions and examine the associated robustness tests.
7.1 Alternative Models of Disease Environment
I next show that the results are not dependent on the precise way in which EDE is constructed. In
Table 15, I display the basic speciﬁcation using alternatives measures of early disease environment,
the colony dummy and the interaction of the two variables. I also include one robustness test
that adds the distance from the equator to the regression.
In 1 and 2, I include the measure "EDE Small" that is predicted from Column 1 of Table 6.
EDE Small is not adjusted for the sampling population, and I thus also construct "EDE Small &
Adjusted" that reproduces the speciﬁcation of Column 1 of Table 6, yet also includes and then
partials out the population dummies. The corresponding regressions are reported in Columns 3
and 4 of Table 15.
Next, in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 15, I use the model of early disease environment from
Column 3 of Table 6. This measure includes the set of 8 geographic variables, but not the
population dummies. Last, in Columns 7 and 8, I use a the model of Column 4 of Table 6 that
also adds latitude to the estimation of early disease environment.
34For these four alternative speciﬁcations, I ﬁnd results that are very similar to the ones that
I ﬁnd when using the main measure of disease environment EDE. First, the interaction of early
disease environment and the colony dummy is signiﬁcant. Second, the instrumented institutions
are signiﬁcant. Third, the coeﬃcients are very comparable to what I ﬁnd when using the main
measure of disease environment EDE.
7.2 Alternative Deﬁnitions of Former Colonies
Are the results presented so far dependent on the precise way in which countries are being classiﬁed
as former colonies versus non-colonized nations? In this section, I repeat the main robustness tests
using two alternative colony dummies.
A country is classiﬁed as a former colony if it ever has either been an oﬃcial colony, was
under the control of an empire-aﬃliated organization such as the Dutch and British East Indies
Companies, had the status of protectorate of a non-adjacent empire, or lost the sovereignty over
its foreign policy following a military conﬂict with a non-adjacent empire. With this deﬁnition,
56 countries are classiﬁed as non-colonized nations, while 95 are classiﬁed as former colonies.
In Table 16, I adopt a deﬁnition that also classiﬁes countries into the group of former colonies if
the country was under a League of Nations mandate after World War I. This in addition classiﬁes
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and West Bank and Gaza as former colonies.
There are thus 100 former colonies and 51 non-colonized nations. In Table 17, I adopt a narrower
deﬁnition of former colonies. The colony dummy equals one only if the country ever has been
an oﬃcial colony, was under the complete control of an empire-aﬃliated organization such as the
Dutch and British East Indies Companies, or had the status of protectorate of a non-adjacent
empire. This classiﬁes the United Arab Emirates and Bhutan as non-colonized nations, leading
to 93 former colonies.
For each of these two alternative deﬁnitions of former colonies, I repeat the basic speciﬁcation
from Table 9 and also present several robustness tests. I only ﬁnd one case where the instrument
— EDE times the colony dummy — is not signiﬁcant. In the latter case - Column 6 of Table 16
- the estimation excludes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA and also controls for
latitude. In all speciﬁcations of Tables 16 and 17 instrumented institutions are signiﬁcant, and
35the magnitude is comparable to ones presented earlier.
7.3 Addressing Albouy’s (2006) Critique
In this section, I address the revisions of the mortality rates made by Albouy (2006). I repeat the
basic analysis of Table 9 using the measure of early disease environment that is predicted from his
revised mortality data. The results are nearly identical to the ones presented in the main section.
The reason for this is the following. I do not directly use the mortality rates sampled from
historical data, but I use the geographic projection of the mortality rates, i.e. that part of
mortality that can be explained by geography. While the mortality rates of Albouy (2006) and
Acemoglu et al. (2001) diﬀer substantially, their geographic projection is nearly identical, and it
thus does not matter which data I use.
This observation is summarized in Figure 5, which presents a scatter plot of the two mortality
series (upper scatter plot), and also a scatter plot of the two corresponding measures of Early
Disease Environment (lower plot). For better comparison, the two measures of EDE — predicted
from Columns 2 and 6 of Table 6 respectively — are not standardized. While there are 17 countries
where the mortality rates diﬀer by more than 0.3 log points (35%), this is only the case for 2
countries (Singapore and Malaysia) for the constructed variables of the geographic potential for
disease.
In Tables 18 and 19, I repeat the basic speciﬁcation from Table 9 and I also present several
robustness tests using "EDE Albouy," predicted from Column 8 of Table 6. I ﬁnd that the
instrument has somewhat less power in some of the robustness tests of Table 19, but overall, the
interaction of EDE Albouy and the colony dummy is still a strong instrument for institutions.
7.4 Additional Controls
In Columns 1 to 4 of Table 20, I add three diﬀerent measures of internal conﬂict to the analysis.
These three variables measure fractionalization along ethnic (in 1), religious (in 2) and linguistic
lines (see 3) and have been constructed by Alesina et al. (2003) following the methodology of
Mauro (1995). The respective indices take values from 0 (the entire population is from the same
group) to 1 (the population consists of a continuum of diﬀerent groups). In Column 4, I add
36all three measures together to the estimation. For these four speciﬁcations, I ﬁnd that ethnic
fractionalization is detrimental to institutional development, whereas the evidence on the other
two indicators of fractionalization is less clear. For Columns 1 to 4, the interaction of EDE and
the colony dummy is a strong predictor for institutions, and instrumented institutions are an
important determinant of economic success.
Next, in Columns 5 to 7, I include measures of a country’s legal origin. In Column 5, I add a
dummy that equals 1 if the country was a member of the Warsaw Pact, which is shown to aﬀect
development negatively though the impact on institutions. Second, I add dummies for countries
that have French or British Legal Origins in Column 6. These measures are from La Porta et
al. (1998). In this speciﬁcation, both institutions with a British or French origin are favorable
for economic performance. In Column 7, the omitted group are all legal origins except French or
British, which includes many economies in transition. In Column 8, I thus add the communist
origins dummy to the speciﬁcation of Column 7, demonstrating that most of the results in Column
7 are driven by the fact that countries with French and British legal origins were not communist.
For all robustness tests of Table 20, I ﬁnd that the interaction is a signiﬁcant instrument for
institutions and that institutions are highly relevant for prosperity.
7.5 Additional Instruments for Institutions
In this section, I introduce further instruments for institutions and check whether the instru-
mented institutional scores are mutually consistent, i.e., I test the over-identiﬁed system. The
additional instruments that I use are scores of democracy in the early 19th century, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, and legal origin dummies.
The results are reported in the now familiar way, where Panel A of Table 21 reports the
ﬁrst stage results with the new instruments included. In all speciﬁcations except Column 2, the
interaction of EDE and the colony dummy is signiﬁcant, while also the added instruments are
signiﬁcant (or at least one of the added dummies in the case of legal origins). Panel B reports
second-stage estimation. In Panel C, I report a heteroscedasticity robust Hansen C-test for over-
identiﬁcation, which never rejects at the 5% level and rejects at the 10% level in one instance.
The ﬁndings are similar to those presented before. Institutions are a main determinant of
37economic performance, while disease environment has a signiﬁcant direct eﬀect on economic de-
velopment. I ﬁrst include the Polity Score from the Polity IV database as an additional instrument.
This measure takes values between -10 and +10 and is higher for more democratic societies. In
Column 1 of Table 21, I include all countries with an available score in 1900 to 1910 and use
the earliest available score. Few countries that still exist today were independent at that time,
and there are thus only 52 observations. Still, both instruments (Polity Score and interaction of
EDE and the colony dummy) are signiﬁcant, and Polity in 1900 is a signiﬁcant determinant of
current institutions. I repeat this estimation in Column 2, but this time, I include all countries
with an available Polity Score before 1961. This inclusion yields the only speciﬁcation where the
interaction of disease and the colony dummy is not signiﬁcant.
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 21, I repeat this exercise, but I focus on a sub-indicator of the
Polity database, "Constraints on the Executive." This variable takes values between 1 and 7 and
measures whether superimposed structures and rules eﬀectively constrain a nation’s executive.
I again include ﬁrst all countries that have a Polity Score in 1900 to 1910 and still exist today
(Column 3) and then those with a polity score before 1961 (Column 4). In both regressions,
constraints on the executive as well as the interaction are signiﬁcant determinants of institutions.
I next include Ethnic Fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003) in the speciﬁcation. This
speciﬁcation is motivated by the ﬁnding from the previous section that ethnic fractionalization
matters for development mostly through institutions. Finally, I turn to the "Legal Origins"
dummies form La Porta et al. (1998). Socialist origin is associated with lower institutional
outcomes (Column 6). The estimation in Column 7, which includes a British and a French legal
origin dummy, yields the only model where the Hansen C-test of overidentiﬁcation is rejected at
the 10 % level. In Column 8, I add all three legal origins dummies, thus eliding only the dummies
for German and Scandinavian origin.
388C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I estimate the partial eﬀects of geographic endowments and institutions on income.
The existing literature fails to distinguish between these two channels of development: Endow-
ments have inﬂuenced colonization policies and, therefore, institutions, but they may also have a
direct eﬀect on economic growth.
The paper’s main insight is that one can utilize the interaction of history and geography to
estimate the partial eﬀects of institutions and geographic endowments on prosperity. Speciﬁc
historical events — such as colonization or the rise of trade with the new world — have inﬂuenced
how climate, transportation costs, and disease have aﬀected development. For example, during
colonization, the mortality rates of European settlers have aﬀected colonization policies, which
in turn determined the quality of property rights institutions in the respective colonies. Disease
environment may however also directly aﬀect economic outcomes.
What distinguishes the direct impact of endowments on income from the indirect impact of
endowments on colonization policies is the following. While the direct impact is present in all
countries, the institutional channel only applies to a subset of countries, namely former colonies.
I next develop an instrumental variable framework that identiﬁes the relation between income
and institutions and, at the same time, also allows for geographic endowments to directly aﬀect
growth. I identify the relation between institutions and income by exploiting the fact that climate
and disease has aﬀected development diﬀerently in diﬀerent groups of countries. The identiﬁcation
restriction employed does not require the main eﬀect of disease environment to be absent in the
estimation. I am thus able to estimate the partial eﬀects of disease and institutions.
I ﬁnd that institutions are the main determinant of development, that endowments also have
a sizeable direct impact on development, and that endowments inﬂuence development mainly
through the prevalence of disease. For example, I ﬁnd that a 0.01 standard deviation diﬀerence
in institutions is associated with a diﬀerence of roughly 1.6% in income per capita, while a 0.01
standard deviation diﬀerence in natural disease environment is associated with a diﬀerence of
0.3% in income per capita.
In line with the main ﬁnding of this study, two policy conclusions arise. First, only the install-
39ment of institutions geared towards aligning social and private incentives can achieve substantial
convergence of the world distribution of income. For example the results of this study suggest
that if Nigeria were to improve the score for the rule of law to the level prevalent in Algeria, it
would be about 2.5 times as rich as it is today.
Second, I also ﬁnd that economic endowments have a large impact on prosperity. For example,
the results imply that if it were possible reduce the level of disease prevailing in Nigeria to the
one prevailing in Algeria, Nigeria would be 62% percent richer than it is today.
Thus, while the results of this paper put forward institutions as the dominant force of de-
velopment, they also highlight the high economic burden of disease and the big gains that poor
nations might realize if the current development eﬀorts to eradicate the world’s major diseases
succeed.
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44Latitude Malaria Maximum  of Average
Ecology Monthly  Rain Temperature
Ethnic Fractionalization [-0.51]** [0.51]** [0.30]** [0.35]**
from Alesina et al. (2004)
French Legal Origin Dummy [-0.37]** [0.19]* [0.04] [0.43]**
from La Porta et al. (1998)
Log Settler Mortality [-0.48]** [0.72]** [0.42]** [0.52]**
from Acemoglu et al. (2001)
Log Population Density in 1500 [-0.26]* [0.14] [0.17] [0.41]**
from Acemoglu et al. (2002)
Table 1 - Pairwise Correlations Between Instruments for Institutions and Measures of Endowments
Notes: Table 1 displays the pairwise correlations between measures of geographic endowments and instrumental variables for institutional outcomes. 
The four instrumental variables are Ethnic Fractionalization, the Logarithm of European Settler Mortality, a dummy for countries with French Legal 
Origin, and the Logarithm of the population density in 1500. Latitude, Maximimum Monthly Rainfall, and Average Temperature are from Parker 
(1997). Malaria Ecology is from Kiszewski et al. (2004); * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%
45(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Former Not Former Not Former Not Former Not Former Not 
Colonies Colonized Colonies Colonized Colonies Colonized Colonies Colonized Colonies Colonized
Average Temp. -0.55 0.02
(std.) [0.14]** [0.13]
Avg. Rainfall 0.03 0.59
(std.) [0.10] [0.23]*
Avg. Elevation -0.08 -0.54
(std.) [0.05] [0.16]**
Temp. at Max.  -0.76 0.11
Humidity (std) [0.14]** [0.14]
Malaria  -0.27 -0.18
Ecology (std.) [0.06]** [0.18]
Observations 95 56 95 56 95 56 95 56 93 54
R-squared 0.164 0 0.002 0.091 0.012 0.114 0.249 0.007 0.13 0.001
Mean 0.549 -0.931 0.175 -0.296 0.095 -0.161 0.578 -0.980 -0.547 0.318
Std. Dev. 0.622 0.814 1.162 0.528 1.154 0.641 0.558 0.801 0.126 1.140
Min -1.835 -2.833 -1.284 -1.203 -0.652 -0.652 -2.074 -2.900 -0.567 -0.567
Max 1.532 1.282 4.312 0.969 3.954 1.899 1.480 1.149 0.363 4.090
Dependent Variable is the  1996-2004 Average Score for "Rule of Law" from Kauffman et al. (2005)
Malaria Ecology Temp. at max. Humidity 
Table 2 - The Differential Effect of Geographic Endowments 
Average Temperature Average Rainfall Average Elevation
Notes: Table 2 presents the relation between geographic variables and the 1996 to 2004 average score of the "Rule of Law" from Kaufmann et al. 
(2005). Average annual temperature, average elevation, and humidity at maximum temperature are from Parker (1997). Average rainfall equals the 
standardized sum of minimum monthly rainfall and maximum monthly rainfall from Parker (1997). Malaria Ecology is taken from Kiszewski et al. 
(2004). All regressors are standardized. The four bottom rows report mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum value of each variable 
and for the respective group. For the sample criterion see main text. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%
46( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
Fm. Colonies Not Colonized Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
Temperature Temperature Temperature Avg. Rainfall Temp./Humidity  Elevation Malaria Ecology
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV
Rule of Law  1.92 1.54 1.64 2.26 -1.19
[0.41]** [0.34]** [0.25]** [0.60]** [5.95]
Temperature (Std.) -0.99 0.11 0.07
[0.22]** [0.22] [0.16]
Avg. Rain (Std) 0
[0.07]
Temp. /max. Humidity  0.02
(Std.) [0.14]




Colony y/n -0.1 -0.24 -0.2 0.24 -1.29
[0.26] [0.29] [0.20] [0.42] [3.14]
Temperature (Std.) -0.55 0.02 0.02
[0.14]** [0.13] [0.13]
Temp * Colony y/n -0.57
[0.19]**
Avg. Rain (Std) 0.59
[0.23]*
Avg. Rain * Colony y/n -0.55
[0.26]*
Temp. /max. Humidity 0.11
 (Std.) [0.14]
Temp. /max. Humidity -0.86
* Colony y/n [0.20]**
Avg. Elevation (Std) -0.54
[0.16]**





 * Colony y/n [0.19]
Colony y/n -0.36 -0.83 -0.32 -0.56 -0.51
[0.19] [0.18]** [0.20] [0.15]** [0.11]**
Coefficient of Examined  0.11 0.9 0.2 -1.25 -0.79
Geographic Variable [0.22] [0.34]** [0.27] [0.18]** [0.26]**
Observations 95 56 151 151 151 151 147
R-sq (first stage) 0.164 0 0.185 0.145 0.229 0.159 0.18
Panel C: Reduced Form Estimation - Dependent is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Table 3  - Estimating the Partial Effects of Selected Endowments and Institutions
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Notes: Table 3 displays the relation between geography and institutional quality (Panel A) and the relation between instrumented institutional quality and 
income (Panel B). Panel C presents a reduced-form estimation of GDP per head on the geographic variable, the colony dummy and the interaction of the 
two. In Columns 1 to 3, the independent variable is the average annual temperature. In Column 1, the sample consists of 95 former colonies, in Column 2 it 
consists of 56 countries that have not been colonized. In all other estimations the sample includes all 151 countries and each regression also adds the 
interaction of the measure of geography with the colony dummy. Average annual temperature, average elevation, and temperature at maximum humidity 
are from Parker (1997) and standardized. Average rainfall equals the standardized sum of minimum monthly rainfall and maximum monthly rainfall from 
Parker (1997). Malaria Ecology is taken from Kiszewski et al. (2004) and standardized. Heteroscedasticity Robust standard errors in parentheses; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
47( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
OLS Full  IV Full  IV Excl.  IV Excl. AUS IV Excl. IV w. Continent IV adding 2nd IV Restricted
Sample Sample Africa CAN, NZL, USA  Warsaw Pact Dummies order Geography Sample
Rule of Law 1996 1.92 1.78 2.17 2.58 1.69 1.47 1.68
to  2004 [0.26]** [0.30]** [0.36]** [0.50]** [0.26]** [0.14]** [0.19]**
Avg. Temperature -0.71 0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.57 0.03 1.14 -0.07
(std.) [0.18]** [0.16] [0.16] [0.17] [0.34] [0.14] [0.31]** [0.11]
Avg. Rainfall  0.03 -0.05 -0.19 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06
(std.) [0.15] [0.08] [0.10] [0.10] [0.13] [0.07] [0.19] [0.13]
Avg. Elevation -0.54 -0.08 0.01 -0.1 0.14 -0.16 -0.32 -0.12
(std.) [0.11]** [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.19] [0.08]* [0.23] [0.16]
Avg. Temperature 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.35 0.24 -0.13 0.14
(std.) [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.13]** [0.15] [0.45] [0.17]
Avg. Rainfall  0.48 0.48 0.48 0.03 0.25 0.26 0.56
(std.) [0.28] [0.28] [0.28] [0.28] [0.29] [0.33] [0.28]*
Avg. Elevation -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.57 -0.16 -0.56 -0.52
(std.) [0.18]* [0.18]* [0.18]* [0.16]** [0.19] [0.20]** [0.15]**
Avg. Temperature -0.98 -0.88 -0.74 -0.53 -0.99 -1.1 -1.08
 (Std.) * Colony y/n [0.20]** [0.21]** [0.21]** [0.18]** [0.19]** [0.22]** [0.21]**
Avg. Rainfall  -0.45 -0.3 -0.47 -0.01 -0.27 -0.66 -0.61
* Colony y/n [0.30] [0.31] [0.30] [0.30] [0.30] [0.31]* [0.31]*
Avg. Elevation 0.09 0.06 0.18 0.24 -0.09 0.04 0.2
 (Std.) * Colony y/n [0.19] [0.20] [0.19] [0.17] [0.20] [0.19] [0.19]
C o l o n y  D u m m y   yyyyyyyy
Continent Dummies y
Square Terms of Endowments y
Joint Wald test of the included geographic variables on LN GDP per Capita in 2003 (combining first and second stage effect)
P Value - <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic (identification/IV relevance test all instrument)
P Value - <0.001 0.002 <0.001 0.03 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Hansen J Test of Overidentication (all Instruments)
P Value - 0.415 0.121 0.168 0.973 0.331 0.400 0.5122
Observations 151 151 104 147 131 151 151 124
R2  First Stage - 0.323 0.272 0.276 0.437 0.399 0.345 0.372
Table 4 - The Colonial and Geographic Origins of Comparative Development 
Panel B: Second Stage Estimation  - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Panel A: First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var is the 1996 to 2004 Average of the Rule of Law from Kaufmann et al. (2005)
 Model Information and Hypothesis Tests 
Notes: Table 4 presents the relation between the rule of law, geography, and income. In Panel B, the dependent variable is logarithm of 2003 per capita GDP. In 
Panel A, the dependent variable is the 1996 to 2004 average of the score for the rule of law. Average Rainfall is the standardized sum of Maximum Monthly 
Rainfall and Minimum Monthly Rainfall from Parker (1997). Average Temperature and Average Elevation are standardized and from Parker (1997). Column 1 
presents the OLS relation between income and geography. From Column 2 onwards, the instrumented score for the rule of law is added. Column 7 adds second 
order coefficients of the three measures of geography. For example, "Temperature Square" equals (Temperature+2.83)^2 where -2.83 is the minimum observed 
value of average temperature. Column 8 omits all observations with values for any of the independent variables outside the intersection of the support in the group 
of former colonies and non-colonized nations. The bottom rows of Table 4 reportp-values corresponding to the hypothesis that all interaction coefficients equal 0 
and to the hypothesis that all main effects of geography (including first and second stage coefficients) equal 0; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
48(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Endogenous Variables Control of Government  adding % w. Rule of  adding % w. adding % w.
Corruption Effectiveness Highschool Law Highschool Primary Ed. 
Instruments (interacted):




Rule of Law  1.39 1.64 1.26 1.53
96-04 [0.48]** [0.25]** [0.32]** [0.22]**
% of total Pop.with  0.03 0.04
some highschool in 95 [0.03] [0.02]
% of total Pop. With 0.01
some Prim. school in 95 [0.01]
Avg. Temperature 0.14 0.12 0.07 -0.09 -0.03 -0.19
(std.) [0.16] [0.14] [0.25] [0.17] [0.15] [0.16]
Avg. Rainfall  -0.17 -0.16 -0.06 0.05 0.05 0
(std.) [0.09] [0.10] [0.07] [0.13] [0.11] [0.12]
Avg. Elevation -0.08 -0.06 0 -0.03 -0.06 -0.13
(std.) [0.13] [0.11] [0.16] [0.11] [0.10] [0.11]
High Temperature at  0.09 0.12 0.07
max. Humidity (std.) [0.22] [0.19] [0.23]
Variation of  -0.22 -0.19 -0.12
Rainfall (std.) [0.11]* [0.11] [0.12]
Shea's Partial R2: Instituions 0.1461 0.1308 0.0427 0.1196 0.102 0.1062
P value Institutions <0.001 <0.001 0.0265 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Shea's Partial R2: Education - - 0.2155 - 0.2576 0.1734
P value Education - - <0.001 - <0.001 <0.001
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic (identification/IV relevance test all instrument)
P Value <0.001 <0.001 0.1354 0.0317 0.0368 0.048
Observations 151 151 96 96 96 96
Panel A: Summary of First Stage Estimation(s)
Table 5 - Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality and the Effect of Human Capital
Panel B: Second Stage Estimation  - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
adding Var. of Rain and High Temp/ max. Humidity Temperature, Rainfall, and Elevation
Notes: In Panel B of Table 5, the dependent variable is the 2003 logarithm of GDP per capita. Panel A summarizes the first stage regression(s) and presents 
Shea's (1997) partial R2 measure and the p value corresponding to the power of the instruments for the endogenous variable in question. Columns 1 and 2 use 
the 1996 to 2004 average of "Control of Corruption" and the "Quality of Government" from Kaufmann et al. (2005) as measures of institutional outcomes. 
From Column 3 onwards, the measure of institutional outcomes is the 1996 to 2004 average of the "Rule of Law." Columns 1 to 3 use the three interactions of 
Table 4 as instruments and Columns 4 to 6 add the interaction of "variation of rainfall" and "high humidity at maximum temperature" with a colony dummy. 
Variation of rainfall equals the (standardized) square of maximum minus minimum monthly rainfall. Columns 3, 5, 6, and 7 add a second endogenous 
variable. Column 3 and 5 add "Percentage of "higher school attained" in the total population in 1995" and Column 6 adds "Percentage of "primary school 
attained" in the total population in 1995." Both variables are from Barro and Lee (2000) and are measured from 1 to 100; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%
49(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rainfall &  Large  adding adding Large Model Rainfall &  Large Model
Temperature Georg. Model KGTEMP Latitude & Population Temperature & Population
Avg. Temperature 0.63 0.64 0.58 0.61 0.49 0.58 0.57
(std.) [0.17]** [0.33] [0.35] [0.34] [0.31] [0.21]** [0.34]
Min. of Monthly Rainfall -0.32 -0.32 -0.36 -0.33 -0.19 -0.23 -0.18
(std.) [0.06]** [0.05]** [0.10]** [0.05]** [0.07]** [0.07]** [0.08]*
Max. of Monthly Rainfall 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.26 0.21
(std.) [0.09]* [0.08] [0.10] [0.08] [0.09] [0.14] [0.17]
Temp. at max Humidity -0.68 -0.64 -0.71 -0.51 -0.39
(std.) [0.28]* [0.37] [0.29]* [0.29] [0.38]
Savanna y/n 0.6 0.53 0.55 0.51 0.39
(std.) [0.19]** [0.21]* [0.22]* [0.21]* [0.25]
Temperate Vegetation y/n -0.7 -0.51 -0.6 -0.61 -0.25
[0.25]** [0.26] [0.31] [0.19]** [0.36]
Mediteranean Climate y/n -1.08 -1.11 -1.05 -0.95 -0.8
[0.31]** [0.35]** [0.32]** [0.30]** [0.38]*
Mountains y/n -0.49 -0.55 -0.51 -0.62 -0.5





Campaign Rate y/n 0.71 0.42
[0.28]* [0.31]
Forced Laborer Rate y/n 0.56 -0.25
[0.26]* [0.26]
Bishop Rate y/n -0.01 0.11
[0.24] [0.30]
P-value: geography <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
P-value: pop. dummies na na na na 0.026 na 0.003
P-value: whole model <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Observations 62 62 60 62 62 60 60
Clusters 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.48 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.72 0.42 0.55
Dependent Variable is the Standardized Ln of Mortality from: Acemoglu et al. (2001) from: Albouy (2006)
Table 6 - The Geographic Determinants of Mortality Rates
Notes: Table 6 presents the relation between geography and the settler mortality estimates taken from historical sources. In Columns 1 to 5, the dependent variable is the 
standardized annual mortality rate from Acemoglu et al. (2001). All dependent variables except dummies and KGPTEMP are standardized. For example, in Column 1, the 
interpretation of the coefficient of Avg. Temperature is that a one standard deviation warmer climate is associated with a 0.63 standard deviation higher logarithm of the 
settler mortality rate. KGPTEMP takes values between 0 and 1 and is equal to population living in temperate areas. In Columns 7 and 8, the dependent variable is the 
annualized and standardized mortality rate from Albouy (2006), Revision 2. The population dummies used in Columns 5 and 7 (for Bishops, Soldiers in Campaigns, and 
Forced Laborers) are from Albouy (2006). Heteroscedasticity robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
50Summary Statistics
Variable Observations  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ln Mortality Acemoglu et al. 2001 (Std.)  62 0.00 1.00 -2.03 2.65
EDE (Pop. Adjusted; from Col. 5) 151 0.00 1.00 -2.71 2.61
EDE not Adjusted (from Col. 2) 151 0.00 1.00 -2.52 2.60
EDE Short not Adjusted (from Col. 1)  151 0.00 1.00 -2.01 2.68
Ln Mortality Albouy (2006) (Rev. 2; Std.)  60 0.00 1.00 -2.07 2.49
EDE Albouy (from Col. 7)  151 0.00 1.00 -2.49 3.17
Ln GDP per Capita 151 7.52 1.63 4.44 10.56
Rule of Law 1996-2004 151 -0.02 0.97 -1.84 2.14
Pairwise Correlation Diagram 
I. II. III. V. VI. VII.
I. Ln Mortality Acemoglu et al. 2001  1.000
II. EDE (Pop. Adjusted; Col. 5) 0.801 1.000
III. EDE not Adjusted (Col. 2) 0.815 0.989 1.000
IV. EDE Short not Adjusted (Col. 1)  0.695 0.772 0.788 1.000
V. Ln Mortality Albouy (2006) (Rev. 2)  0.860 0.699 0.701 0.643 1.000
VI. EDE Albouy (Col. 7)  0.778 0.979 0.965 0.854 0.708 1.000
Table 7 - Data Summary and Pairwise Correlation Diagram
Notes: Table 7 presents summary statistics and a pair wise correlation diagram for the mortality series of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Albouy 
(2006), the constructed measures of Early Disease Environment, the 1996-2004 average of the score for Rule of Law from Kauffman et al. 
(2004), and income per capita. The measures of Early Disease Environment are predicted using the models of Table 6. If appropriate, the 
sampling population has been partialed out when predicting the measure of disease environment. For the sample criterion see main text. 
51(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Additional All former All Not  Full
Colonies Colonies Colonized Sample
((4) + (5)) Countries
OLS IV IV OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Mortality rate (from  -0.587 -0.74 -0.693
Acemoglu et al., std.) [0.127]** [0.135]** [0.140]**
EDE -0.609 -0.471 -0.566 -0.022 -0.022
[0.112]** [0.128]** [0.090]** [0.158] [0.157]




R-sq 0.435 na na 0.389 0.212 0.332 0 0.266
No. Observations 62 62 62 62 33 95 56 151
No. Clusters 35 35 35 62 33 95 56 151
EDE 1st stage see 0.879
Column 2  (0.121)**
of Table 6
Testing for weak identification
Cragg-Donald (1993) F statistic 13.11 107.03
Stock-Yogo (2005) 10% crit. value 11.39 16.38
R-sq first stage na 0.66 0.389 na na na na na
Table 8 - Settler Mortality Rates, Early Disease Environment, and Institutions
Panel B: OLS and Second Stage - Dep. Var. is the 1996 to 2004 Avg. Score for "Rule of Law" from Kauffman et al. (2005)
Panel A: First Stage - Dependent variable is the mortality rate from Acemoglu et al. (2001)
Sample of former colonies from Acemoglu et al.
(2001)
Notes: Table 8 presents the relation between settler mortality rates, mortality, and institutional quality. In the upper Panel B, the relation between disease and 
institutional quality is presented, while Panel A (if applicable) presents the relationship between Early Disease Environment and mortality rates. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is 1996-2004 Average of the score for "Rule of Law" from Kauffman et al. In Columns 1 to 4, the sample is equal to that of Acemoglu et al. 
(2001), but Bahamas and Malta are excluded since their Population is less than 500,000. Column 5 presents the results for the 33 additional former colonies, 
while Column 7 presents the results for 52 independent nations. In Columns 2 to 8, the measure of early disease environment (EDE) is predicted from Table 6, 
Column 5. The variable "EDE * Colony y/n" is the interaction of the colony dummy and EDE. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors reported in brackets; 
where applicable the standard errors are clustered; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
52(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All former Not Coloni- Full Full Full Full
Colonies zed Nations  Sample Sample Sample Sample
IV IV IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
Rule of Law  1.709 1.916 2.077 13.033 1.624 1.191
[0.241]** [0.250]** [0.233]** [80.414] [0.265]** [0.377]**
EDE  -0.943 -0.878 -0.256 0.081
[0.121]** [0.140]** [0.100]* [0.259]
EDE Square -0.098
[0.072]
Colony y/n -0.245 0.108 0.024
[0.278] [0.180] [0.149]
R - S q ---- 0 . 3 3 5 0 . 3 3 9 --
Mortality rate (from  -0.587
Acemoglu et al.; std.) [0.127]**
EDE -0.609 -0.566 -0.022 -0.022 -0.145
[0.112]** [0.090]** [0.158] [0.157] [0.322]




Colony y/n -0.397 -0.429
[0.185]* [0.181]*
Observations 62 62 95 56 151 151 151 151
Clusters 35 62 95 56 151 151 151 151
R-sq first stage 0.435 0.389 0.332 0 - - 0.266 0.267
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Table 9 - Estimating the Partial Effect of Disease, Institutions, and Geography
Sample of former colonies
from Acemoglu et al. (2001)
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Notes: Table 9 presents the first stage relation between early disease environment and institutional quality (Panel A) and the second stage relation between instrumented 
institutional quality and income (Panel B). EDE is predicted from Table 6, Column 5. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9, the sample is equal to that of Acemoglu et al. (2001) except 
that Bahamas and Malta are excluded since their population is less than 500,000. For the sample criterion in the other Columns of Table 9 see main text. The variable "EDE * 
Colony y/n" is the interaction of the colony dummy and the demeaned EDE. Because the interaction coefficient is demeaned in this way, the colony dummy itself captures the 
total impact of colonization for a country with average disease environment. "EDE Square" equals (EDE+2.72)^2, where -2.72 is the minimum value of EDE in the sample. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
53(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rule of Law  1.12 1.08 1.89 1.96 1.54 1.59 1.21 1.16
[0.28]** [0.37]** [0.44]** [0.51]** [0.22]** [0.25]** [0.20]** [0.26]**
EDE -0.27 -0.24 -0.25 -0.31 -0.3 -0.38 -0.2 -0.19
[0.10]* [0.09]** [0.12]* [0.11]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.07]** [0.07]**
Colony y/n 0.19 0.31 0.34 0.05 0.21 0 0.09 0.16
[0.14] [0.33] [0.29] [0.29] [0.22] [0.24] [0.25] [0.35]
Latitude (Std.) 0.11 -0.25 -0.24 0.07
[0.25] [0.29] [0.23] [0.17]
Africa y/n -0.82 -0.83
[0.43] [0.44]
Americas y/n  0.22 0.23
[0.35] [0.35]
Asia y/n -0.27 -0.26
[0.25] [0.25]
Oceania y/n -0.46 -0.43
[0.30] [0.29]
EDE -0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.24
[0.16] [0.15] [0.16] [0.15] [0.17] [0.15]* [0.16] [0.16]
EDE* Colony y/n -0.64 -0.51 -0.4 -0.36 -0.69 -0.6 -0.73 -0.59
[0.23]** [0.23]* [0.18]* [0.18]* [0.19]** [0.16]** [0.19]** [0.20]**
Colony y/n -0.35 0.31 -0.52 0.02 -0.9 -0.27 0.25 0.53
[0.20] [0.27] [0.18]** [0.23] [0.21]** [0.21] [0.24] [0.27]*
Latitude (Std.) 0.51 0.42 0.61 0.31
[0.17]** [0.14]** [0.14]** [0.14]*
Africa y/n -1.29 -1.11
[0.31]** [0.33]**
Americas y/n  -1.37 -1.09
[0.33]** [0.38]**
Asia y/n -0.99 -0.76
[0.25]** [0.27]**
Oceania y/n -0.65 -0.4
[0.55] [0.53]
Observations 104 104 147 147 131 131 151 151
R-sq first stage 0.131 0.218 0.236 0.292 0.392 0.507 0.378 0.403
of the Warsaw Pact
Adding Continent 
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Dummies
Table 10  - Basic Robustness Tests




(AUS, CAN, NZL, USA)
Excluding Members 
Notes: Table 10 presents basic robustness tests, each without (odd numbered columns) and with controlling for latitude (even numbered columns). Panel A displays the 
first stage relation between the instruments and the 1996 to 2004 average score for the rule of law. Panel B displays the second stage relationship between institutions, 
disease, and income. In Columns 1 and 2, 47 African countries are excluded from the regression. In Columns 3 and 4, the four Neo-Europes Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the USA are excluded. In Columns 5 and 6, all former members of the Warsaw Pact are excluded. This excludes 14 former members of the Soviet Union 
(Turkmenistan does not have a 2003 World Bank GDP estimate), Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the Check and Slovak Republics, and Romania. Columns 7 and 8 include 
continent dummies, whith Europe being the omitted group. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
54(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Rule of Law  1.7 1.68 1.46 1.44
[0.33]** [0.32]** [0.27]** [0.25]**
EDE -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.32
[0.09]** [0.08]** [0.10]** [0.09]**
Colony y/n 0.5 -0.13 -0.12 -1.24 0.06 0.06
[0.36] [0.27] [0.28] [0.24]** [0.16] [0.16]
Latitude (Std.) 1.09 -0.22 -0.2
[0.17]** [0.24] [0.24]
Landlocked y/n -1.28 -0.66 -0.67
[0.27]** [0.20]** [0.19]**
R-sq 0.315 0.231
EDE 0.1 0.13 -0.05 -0.07
[0.15] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15]
EDE* Colony y/n -0.45 -0.52 -0.5 -0.49
[0.18]* [0.20]* [0.17]** [0.17]**
Colony y/n 0.18 0.26 -0.39 -0.43
[0.23] [0.26] [0.18]* [0.19]*
Latitude (Std.) 0.47 0.6
[0.14]** [0.22]**
Latitude  *  -0.21
Colony y/n [0.28]
Landlocked y/n -0.34 -0.52
[0.17]* [0.38]
Landlocked y/n *  0.29
Colony y/n [0.41]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151
R-sq first stage 0.336 0.34 0.285 0.288
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"





Notes: Table 11 examines the effect of distance from equator (Latitude) and a "Landlocked" dummy on income conditional on 
colonial history and early disease environment. The Landlocked dummy is from Parker (1997). In Columns 1 and 4, the respective 
measure is simply added to the basic instrumental variable specification. In Columns 2 and 5, EDE and the interaction of EDE with 
the colony dummy is added in the first stage. Columns 3 and 6 also add the interaction of the respective geographic variable with the 
colony dummy to test whether the variable in question had a different effect on development in former colonies and other countries. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
55(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Rule of Law  1.49 1.32 1.72 1.86
[0.30]** [0.28]** [0.33]** [0.35]**
EDE -0.29 -0.35 -0.31 -0.3
[0.12]* [0.11]** [0.09]** [0.10]**
Colony y/n -1.38 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.02
[0.26]** [0.18] [0.17] [0.29] [0.20] [0.21]
Oil rich y/n 1.2 0.66 0.72
[0.31]** [0.22]** [0.21]**
KGPTEMP 2.38 -0.35 -0.52
[0.32]** [0.47] [0.50]
R-sq 0.229 0.418
EDE -0.08 -0.1 0.23 0.25
[0.18] [0.18] [0.17] [0.18]
EDE* Colony y/n -0.46 -0.45 -0.47 -0.53
[0.20]* [0.20]* [0.17]** [0.20]**
Colony y/n -0.44 -0.39 -0.09 0
[0.20]* [0.23] [0.18] [0.24]
Oil rich y/n 0.27 0.43
(>50,000 brl / cap) [0.19] [0.43]






Observations 151 144 144 144 144 144
R-sq first stage 0.293 0.295 0.407 0.408
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Table 12  - Estimating the Effect of Selected Geographic Variables  II
Full Sample Full Sample
Notes: Table 12 examines the effect of KGPTEMP and a dummy for oil rich countries. KGPTEMP is constructed by Mellinger et al. 
(2000), takes values between 0 and 1, and measures the fraction of the population living in temperate areas. The dummy for oil rich 
countries equals 1 if Parker (1997) lists the country to have more than 50,000 barrels of oil per capita in 1994. In Columns 1 and 4, 
the respective measure is simply added to the basic instrumental variable specification. In Columns 2 and 5, EDE and the 
interaction of EDE with the colony dummy is added in the first stage. Columns 3 and 6 also add the interaction of the respective 
geographic variable with the colony dummy to test whether the variable in question had a different effect on development in former 
colonies and other countries. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
56(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Rule of Law  1.7 1.69 1.62 1.64
[0.28]** [0.27]** [0.31]** [0.31]**
EDE -0.33 -0.33 -0.26 -0.25
[0.11]** [0.11]** [0.10]* [0.10]*
Colony y/n -0.59 -0.09 -0.09 -0.88 0.11 0.11
[0.38] [0.21] [0.21] [0.28]** [0.18] [0.18]
Avg. Temperature  -0.44 0.22 0.22
(std.) [0.19]* [0.12] [0.12]
Max. Monthly  -0.45 0 0
Rainfall (std.) [0.12]** [0.08] [0.08]
R-sq 0.171 - - 0.199 - -
EDE -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
[0.17] [0.17] [0.16] [0.16]
EDE * Colony y/n -0.55 -0.53 -0.5 -0.5
[0.18]** [0.21]* [0.19]** [0.19]**
Colony y/n -0.41 -0.41 -0.35 -0.33
[0.20]* [0.20]* [0.19] [0.20]
Avg. Temperature  0.01 0.03
(std.) [0.11] [0.14]
Avg. Temp. *  -0.04
Colony y/n [0.23]
Max. Monthly  -0.09 -0.11
Rainfall (std.) [0.07] [0.28]
Max Mon. Rain *  0.03
Colony y/n [0.29]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151
R-sq first stage - 0.266 0.266 - 0.271 0.272
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Table 13  - Estimating the Effect of Selected Geographic Variables  III
Full Sample Full Sample
Notes: Table 13 examines the effect of (standardized) average temperature and a maximum monthly rainfall (also standardized) on 
income conditional on colonial history and early disease environment. All data is from Parker (1997). In Columns 1 and 4, the 
respective measure is simply added to the basic instrumental variable specification. In Columns 2 and 5, EDE and the interaction of 
EDE with the colony dummy is added in the first stage. Columns 3 and 6 also add the interaction of the respective geographic 
variable with the colony dummy to test whether the variable in question had a different effect on development in former colonies 
and other countries. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
57(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Rule of Law  1.31 1.31 1.66 1.66
[0.26]** [0.26]** [0.28]** [0.28]**
EDE -0.23 -0.23 -0.26 -0.26
[0.09]* [0.10]* [0.10]* [0.10]**
Colony y/n -0.74 0.03 0.03 -0.83 0.06 0.06
[0.27]** [0.15] [0.15] [0.31]** [0.19] [0.19]
ME (std.)  -0.7 -0.23 -0.23
[0.09]** [0.08]** [0.08]**
Tropics y/n -0.77 0.15 0.15
[0.30]* [0.20] [0.20]
R-sq 0.308 - - 0.172 - -
EDE 0 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
[0.16] [0.17] [0.16] [0.17]
EDE* Colony y/n -0.61 -0.62 -0.52 -0.51
[0.21]** [0.22]** [0.18]** [0.19]**
Colony y/n -0.48 -0.35 -0.31 -0.3
[0.19]* [0.12]** [0.19] [0.21]
ME (std.)  0.05 -0.2
[0.08] [0.30]
ME * Colony y/n 0.25
[0.32]
Tropics y/n -0.21 -0.06
[0.15] [0.26]
Tropics y/n * -0.15
 Colony y/n [0.31]
Observations 147 147 147 151 151 151
R-sq first stage - 0.28 0.281 - 0.273 0.273
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Table 14 - Estimating the Effect of Selected Geographic Variables IV
Malaria Ecology
missing BHR, PRI, SYR, and WBG
Tropical Climate 
Full Sample
Notes: Table 14 examines the effect of Malaria Ecology (ME) and a "Tropics" dummy on income. Malaria Ecology is a measure 
of the geographic potential for malaria and is taken from Kiszewski et al. (2004). ME is standardized. The Tropics dummy equals 
one if Parker (1997) lists the country to have either "Tropical Wet" or "Tropical Wet/Dry" climate. In Columns 1 and 4, the 
respective measure is simply added to the basic instrumental variable specification. In Columns 2 and 5, EDE and the interaction 
of EDE with the colony dummy is added in the first stage. Columns 3 and 6 also add the interaction of the respective geographic 
variable with the colony dummy to test whether the variable in question had a different effect on development in former colonies 
and other countries. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
58(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Rule of Law  1.93 1.87 1.91 1.88 1.61 1.65 1.63 1.71
[0.39]** [0.30]** [0.35]** [0.31]** [0.29]** [0.34]** [0.27]** [0.34]**
EDE Small 0.07 -0.02
[0.20] [0.15]
EDE Small & Adjusted 0.07 -0.03
[0.18] [0.16]
EDE Large Not Adjusted -0.24 -0.29
[0.12]* [0.10]**
EDE Latitude  -0.25 -0.31
[0.10]* [0.09]**
Latitude (Std.) -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.22
[0.22] [0.24] [0.23] [0.24]
Colony y/n -0.09 -0.2 -0.09 -0.2 0.07 -0.12 0.11 -0.13
[0.20] [0.26] [0.22] [0.26] [0.17] [0.27] [0.18] [0.27]
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
EDE Small -0.15 0.23
[0.15] [0.17]
EDE Small * Colony y/n -0.54 -0.68
[0.18]** [0.17]**
EDE Small & Adjusted -0.07 0.35
[0.14] [0.16]*
EDE Small & Adjusted * -0.63 -0.7
Colony y/n [0.18]** [0.16]**
EDE Large Not Adjusted -0.09 0.04
[0.16] [0.16]
EDE Large Not Adjusted * -0.49 -0.43
Colony y/n [0.19]** [0.18]*
EDE Latitude  -0.03 0.09
[0.16] [0.15]
EDE Latitude *  -0.54 -0.45
Colony y/n [0.18]** [0.18]*
Latitude (Std.) 0.57 0.63 0.45 0.47
[0.14]** [0.15]** [0.13]** [0.14]**
Colony y/n -0.19 0.29 -0.21 0.23 -0.36 0.2 -0.39 0.18
[0.18] [0.20] [0.19] [0.19] [0.18] [0.22] [0.19]* [0.23]
O b s e r v a t i o n s 1 5 11 5 11 5 11 5 11 5 11 5 11 5 11 5 1
R-sq first stage 0.283 0.368 0.258 0.352 0.284 0.35 0.267 0.336
 & Latitude Disease Environment
Table 15  - Different Models of Early Disease Environment 
Small model of EDE
Adjusted for Sampling Pop.
Large Model of EDE
Not Adjusted for Pop.
Large Model of EDE Small model of Early 
Notes: Table 15 presents the basic IV specification using alternative geographic models of Early Disease Environment (EDE). Panel A presents the first stage relation between the 
instruments and rule of law and Panel B the second stage relationship. The respective alternative measures of EDE are predicted using the models of Table 6. Columns 1 and 2 
present the results when using the short model of Column 1 of Table 6. Columns 3 and 4 present the results when using the short model adjusted for population (not reported in 
Table 6). Columns 5 and 6 present the results when using the large model disease environment, but unadjusted for sampling population (Column 2 of Table 6). Columns (7) and 
(8) present the results when using the main model of disease but also including latitude to predict EDE (from Column 4 of Table 6). Robust standard errors in parentheses; * 
s i g n i f i c a n ta t5 % ;** s i g n i f i c a n ta t1 %
59(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rule of Law  1.58 1.66 1.11 1.06 1.81 1.91 1.46 1.5 1.17 1.1
[0.25]** [0.34]** [0.28]** [0.38]** [0.39]** [0.52]** [0.19]** [0.22]** [0.21]** [0.28]**
EDE -0.28 -0.32 -0.28 -0.26 -0.28 -0.32 -0.35 -0.4 -0.22 -0.2
[0.10]** [0.09]** [0.11]** [0.10]** [0.11]* [0.10]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.08]** [0.08]**
Colony y/n 0.13 -0.05 0.19 0.32 0.34 0.11 0.25 0.12 0.2 0.31
[0.17] [0.28] [0.14] [0.33] [0.27] [0.28] [0.21] [0.23] [0.27] [0.38]
Latitude (Std.) -0.17 0.11 -0.21 -0.16 0.11
[0.24] [0.25] [0.29] [0.20] [0.17]
Africa y/n -0.94 -0.96
[0.46]* [0.48]*
Americas y/n  0.1 0.11
[0.39] [0.39]
Asia y/n -0.36 -0.36
[0.29] [0.30]
Oceania y/n -0.56 -0.52
[0.31] [0.30]
EDE 0 0.09 0 0.1 0 0.08 0.27 0.43 0.18 0.2
[0.17] [0.16] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.16] [0.19] [0.15]** [0.17] [0.17]
EDE * Colony y/n -0.57 -0.44 -0.65 -0.51 -0.44 -0.35 -0.84 -0.73 -0.7 -0.56
[0.19]** [0.19]* [0.24]** [0.24]* [0.19]* [0.19] [0.21]** [0.17]** [0.20]** [0.21]**
Colony y/n -0.42 0.18 -0.36 0.28 -0.53 0.03 -1.14 -0.53 0.34 0.58
[0.21] [0.25] [0.22] [0.28] [0.21]* [0.25] [0.26]** [0.23]* [0.25] [0.28]*
Latitude (Std.) 0.47 0.49 0.42 0.57 0.31
[0.13]** [0.16]** [0.14]** [0.13]** [0.14]*
Africa y/n -1.36 -1.14
[0.31]** [0.33]**
Americas y/n  -1.44 -1.12
[0.32]** [0.38]**
Asia y/n -1.04 -0.83
[0.26]** [0.27]**
Oceania y/n -0.71 -0.43
[0.55] [0.54]
Observations 151 151 104 104 147 147 131 131 151 151
R-sq first stage 0.264 0.336 0.129 0.216 0.231 0.292 0.415 0.522 0.38 0.405






(AUS, CAN, NZL, USA)
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Excluding Members  Full sample
of the Warsaw Pact
Notes: Table 16 reproduces the main result and some robustness tests using a wider definition of former colonies. The colony dummy used in this table equals 1 if a country was either officially 
colonized, ever had the official status of "protectorate," ever was under the control of an empire-affiliated organization, ever lost the sovereignty over its foreign policy to a non-adjacent empire, or 
was under a League of Nations mandate after World War I. Using this definition, there are 100 former colonies and 51 independent nations. Panel A presents the first stage relation between the 
instruments and rule of law and Panel B the second stage relationship. Column 1 includes only the measure of early disease environment, its interaction with the colony dummy, and the colony 
dummy itself. Column 2 and every even numbered specification also controls for latitude. Columns 3 and 4 exclude African countries, Columns 5 and 6 the four Neo-Europes and Columns 7 and 
8 add continent dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
60(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rule of Law  1.66 1.74 1.21 1.19 1.95 2 1.59 1.64 1.25 1.23
[0.26]** [0.31]** [0.26]** [0.32]** [0.45]** [0.49]** [0.22]** [0.24]** [0.19]** [0.24]**
EDE -0.24 -0.3 -0.24 -0.23 -0.24 -0.31 -0.28 -0.38 -0.19 -0.18
[0.10]* [0.09]** [0.10]* [0.09]** [0.12] [0.11]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.07]** [0.07]*
Colony y/n 0.11 -0.14 0.19 0.23 0.37 0.06 0.22 -0.01 0.02 0.05
[0.19] [0.25] [0.14] [0.29] [0.32] [0.28] [0.23] [0.24] [0.24] [0.32]
Latitude (Std.) -0.23 0.03 -0.26 -0.28 0.03
[0.22] [0.22] [0.27] [0.22] [0.16]
Africa y/n -0.72 -0.72
[0.41] [0.42]
Americas y/n  0.31 0.32
[0.34] [0.33]
Asia y/n -0.22 -0.21
[0.24] [0.24]
Oceania y/n -0.41 -0.39
[0.30] [0.30]
EDE -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.1 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.25
[0.15] [0.15] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16] [0.15]* [0.16] [0.16]
EDE * Colony y/n -0.56 -0.48 -0.68 -0.57 -0.41 -0.38 -0.69 -0.63 -0.76 -0.63
[0.18]** [0.17]** [0.23]** [0.22]* [0.18]* [0.17]* [0.19]** [0.16]** [0.19]** [0.20]**
Colony y/n -0.41 0.12 -0.37 0.23 -0.54 -0.05 -0.88 -0.29 0.19 0.44
[0.18]* [0.22] [0.20] [0.25] [0.18]** [0.22] [0.20]** [0.20] [0.24] [0.27]
Latitude (Std.) 0.45 0.48 0.39 0.61 0.29
[0.13]** [0.16]** [0.14]** [0.14]** [0.14]*
Africa y/n -1.25 -1.07
[0.31]** [0.33]**
Americas y/n  -1.34 -1.07
[0.33]** [0.38]**
Asia y/n -0.96 -0.74
[0.24]** [0.26]**
Oceania y/n -0.62 -0.39
[0.55] [0.54]
Observations 151 151 104 104 147 147 131 131 151 151
R-sq first stage 0.27 0.34 0.14 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.4 0.51 0.38 0.4
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"




(AUS, CAN, NZL, USA)
Excluding Members  Full sample
of the Warsaw Pact
Table 17 - Main Results and Basic Robustness Using a Narrow Definition of Former Colonies
Adding Continent 
Dummies
Notes: Table 17 reproduces the main result and some robustness tests using a narrow definition of former colonies. The colony dummy used in this table equals 1 if a country was either officially 
colonized, ever had the official status of "protectorate," or ever was under the control of an empire-affiliated organization. Using this definition, there are 91 former colonies and 60 independent 
nations. Panel A presents the first stage relation between the instruments and rule of law and Panel B the second stage relationship. Column 1 includes only the measure of early disease environment, 
its interaction with the colony dummy, and the colony dummy itself. Column 2 and every even numbered specification also controls for latitude. Columns 3 and 4 exclude African countries, Columns 
5 and 6 the four Neo-Europes and Columns 7 and 8 add continent dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
61(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All former  Not  Full Full Full Full
Colonies Colonized Sample Sample Sample Sample
Countries
IV IV IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
Rule of Law  1.628 1.893 2.032 5.989 1.808 1.814
[0.258]** [0.250]** [0.220]** [14.345] [0.347]** [0.429]**
EDE Albouy -0.945 -0.908 -0.157 -0.162
[0.115]** [0.139]** [0.146] [0.242]
EDE Albouy Square 0.001
[0.055]
Colony y/n -0.129 0.131 0.133
[0.289] [0.201] [0.213]
R-Sq - - - - 0.337 0.338 - -
Mortality rate (from  -0.464
Albouy (2006); std.) [0.126]**
EDE Albouy -0.572 -0.574 -0.053 -0.075 -0.112
[0.119]** [0.096]** [0.168] [0.159] [0.330]
EDE Albouy  -0.493 -0.51
* Colony y/n [0.178]** [0.195]**
EDE Albouy Sq. 0.009
[0.057]
Colony y/n -0.352 -0.356
[0.190] [0.185]
Observations 60 60 95 56 151 151 151 151
Clusters 60 60 95 56 151 151 151 151
R-sq first stage 0.267 0.351 0.332 0.001 0.731 0.731 0.267 0.267
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Table 18 - Repeating the Basic Analysis with the Mortality Data of Albouy (2006)
Sample of former colonies
from Albouy (2006)
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Notes: Table 18 presents the first stage relation between early disease environment and institutional quality (Panel A) and the second stage relation between 
instrumented institutional quality and income (Panel B). The measure of early disease environment (EDE Albouy) is predicted from Column 7 in Table 6, 
partialling out the sampling population. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 18, the sample is equal to that of Albouy (2006) except that Bahamas and Malta are 
excluded since their Population is less than 500,000. For the sample criterion in the other Columns of Table 18 see main text. The variable "EDE Albouy * 
Colony y/n" is the interaction of the colony dummy and EDE. The measure "EDE Albouy Square" equals (EDE Albouy +2.49)^2, where -2.49 is the minimum 
observed value of EDE Albouy. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
62(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rule of Law  1.19 1.19 1.91 1.87 1.61 1.62 1.23 1.21
[0.29]** [0.32]** [0.50]** [0.45]** [0.27]** [0.26]** [0.19]** [0.22]**
EDE -0.26 -0.25 -0.22 -0.32 -0.24 -0.35 -0.17 -0.15
[0.12]* [0.10]* [0.16] [0.11]** [0.12]* [0.10]** [0.09]* [0.08]
Colony y/n 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.06 0.21 -0.01 0.08 0.14
[0.15] [0.30] [0.29] [0.27] [0.24] [0.24] [0.24] [0.32]
Latitude (Std.) 0.02 -0.23 -0.25 0.06
[0.23] [0.25] [0.23] [0.16]
Africa y/n -0.82 -0.81
[0.40]* [0.40]*
Americas y/n  0.26 0.28
[0.33] [0.32]
Asia y/n -0.25 -0.23
[0.24] [0.24]
Oceania y/n -0.43 -0.41
[0.30] [0.30]
EDE -0.05 0.18 -0.05 0.14 0.03 0.31 0.3 0.38
[0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.19] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17]*
EDE* Colony y/n -0.61 -0.56 -0.38 -0.41 -0.6 -0.6 -0.82 -0.72
[0.24]* [0.22]* [0.19]* [0.18]* [0.21]** [0.17]** [0.20]** [0.20]**
Colony y/n -0.27 0.34 -0.48 0.02 -0.8 -0.22 0.26 0.54
[0.20] [0.25] [0.19]* [0.22] [0.21]** [0.21] [0.25] [0.26]*
Latitude (Std.) 0.55 0.44 0.63 0.35
[0.18]** [0.15]** [0.15]** [0.14]*
Africa y/n -1.43 -1.24
[0.32]** [0.33]**
Americas y/n  -1.47 -1.18
[0.34]** [0.38]**
Asia y/n -1.07 -0.86
[0.25]** [0.27]**
Oceania y/n -0.72 -0.49
[0.56] [0.53]
Observations 104 104 147 147 131 131 151 151
R-sq first stage 0.128 0.221 0.237 0.295 0.389 0.503 0.386 0.417
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Dummies
Table 19  - Robustness Tests for the Data of Albouy (2006)




(AUS, CAN, NZL, USA)
Excluding Members 
of the Warsaw Pact
Adding Continent 
Notes: Table 19 reproduces the basic robustness tests of Table 7 using EDE Albouy. EDE Albouy is predicted from Column 7 of Table 6, partialing out the sampling 
population dummies. Each specification is estimated without (odd numbered columns) and with controlling for latitude (even numbered column). In Columns 1 and 2, 
47 African countries (all colonies) are excluded from the estimation. In Columns 3 and 4, the four Neoeuropes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA are 
excluded. In Columns 5 and 6, all former members of the Warsaw Pact are excluded. This excludes 14 former members of the Soviet Union (Turkmenistan does not 
have a 2003 World Bank GDP estimate) and Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the Check and Slovak Republic, and Romania. Columns 7 and 8 add continent dummies, 
where European countries are the omitted group. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
63(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Warsaw Pact Legal Origin Legal Origin
Ethnic Religion Linguistic All three Dummy  Dummies & Warsaw P. 
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Rule of Law  1.71 1.56 1.35 1.45 1.56 1.9 1.61
[0.40]** [0.25]** [0.31]** [0.34]** [0.22]** [0.46]** [0.24]**
EDE -0.24 -0.29 -0.26 -0.26 -0.29 -0.17 -0.32
[0.10]* [0.10]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.18] [0.10]**
Colony y/n 0.08 0.13 0.06 -0.01 0.22 0.3 0.21
[0.19] [0.17] [0.15] [0.16] [0.22] [0.34] [0.25]
Frac. Ethnic 0.23 0.83
[0.58] [0.66]
Frac. Rel -0.45 -0.18
[0.33] [0.41]
Frac. Linguist -0.79 -1.12
[0.34]* [0.45]*
Warsaw Pact y/n 0.31 0.52
[0.25] [0.28]
Legor UK y/n -0.55 -0.04
[0.47] [0.22]
Legor FRA y/n 0.08 0.47
[0.28] [0.18]**
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
EDE 0 0 -0.02 0.04 0.11 -0.14 0.12
[0.14] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16] [0.17] [0.17]
EDE * Colony y/n -0.39 -0.56 -0.45 -0.4 -0.68 -0.39 -0.64
[0.18]* [0.19]** [0.18]* [0.18]* [0.18]** [0.19]* [0.19]**
Colony y/n -0.27 -0.43 -0.32 -0.25 -0.89 -0.7 -0.95
[0.18] [0.19]* [0.18] [0.18] [0.21]** [0.19]** [0.22]**
Frac. Ethnic -1.14 -1.47
[0.32]** [0.35]**
Frac. Rel 0.28 0.59
[0.28] [0.29]*
Frac. Linguist -0.57 0.02
[0.25]* [0.27]
Warsaw Pact y/n -1.12 -1.17
[0.22]** [0.29]**
Legor UK y/n 0.81 0.2
[0.23]** [0.28]
Legor FRA y/n 0.43 -0.16
[0.21]* [0.26]
Observations 148 151 148 145 151 150 150
R-sq first stage 0.331 0.27 0.288 0.366 0.376 0.324 0.404
Measures of Fractionalisation
Table 20 - Sociologic and Historical Controls
Notes: Table 20 tests for the effect of natural oil abundance, measures of fractionalization, and legal origins conditional on colonial history and early 
disease environment. Columns 1 to 3 respectively add measures of ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization and Column 4 adds all three 
measures. These measures are from Alesina et al. (2004), take values from 0 and 1 and are the higher the more heterogeneous a country is (Ethnic is 
missing for PRI, WBG, YEM while Language is missing for HTI, RWA, and SLV). In Column 5, a dummy that equals 1 for the 20 former Warsaw 
Pact members of the sample is added. In Column 6, two dummies for countries with French or British legal origins (from La Porta et al. (1999), 
missing WBG) are included. Column 7 includes both the legal origins dummies and the Warsaw Pact dummy. Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
64(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ethnic Warsaw Pact Legal Org. Colonizer
before 1911 before 1961 before 1911 before 1961 Fract. Dummy Dummies & Soviet
Rule of Law  1.07 1.36 1.07 1.31 1.57 1.39 1.22 1.27
[0.13]** [0.19]** [0.14]** [0.16]** [0.17]** [0.15]** [0.20]** [0.14]**
EDE -0.33 -0.34 -0.32 -0.37 -0.27 -0.35 -0.41 -0.39
[0.17] [0.12]** [0.17] [0.10]** [0.08]** [0.09]** [0.10]** [0.09]**
Colony y/n 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03
[0.18] [0.19] [0.22] [0.19] [0.17] [0.15] [0.15] [0.14]
P Value  0.727 0.122 0.754 0.111 0.665 0.192 0.076 0.115
EDE -0.87 -0.41 -0.83 -0.44 -0.39 -0.68 -0.39 -0.58
[0.24]** [0.21] [0.23]** [0.18]* [0.18]* [0.18]** [0.19]* [0.19]**
EDE * Colony y/n 0.16 -0.09 0.21 -0.03 0 0.11 -0.14 0.05
[0.22] [0.19] [0.16] [0.16] [0.14] [0.16] [0.17] [0.16]
Colony y/n -1.49 -0.79 -1.36 -0.76 -0.27 -0.89 -0.7 -0.99
[0.27]** [0.18]** [0.24]** [0.17]** [0.18] [0.21]** [0.19]** [0.21]**
Early Polity Score  0.09 0.04
[0.02]** [0.01]**
Early constraints  0.26 0.15
on executive [0.04]** [0.03]**
Frac Ethnic -1.14
[0.32]**
Warsaw Pact y/n -1.12 -1.04
[0.22]** [0.23]**
Legor UK y/n 0.81
[0.23]**
Legor FRA y/n 0.43
[0.21]*
Colony UK y/n 0.47
[0.15]**
Colony FRA y/n 0.05
[0.17]
Observations 52 102 52 102 148 151 150 151
R-sq first stage 0.643 0.528 0.685 0.569 0.331 0.376 0.324 0.413
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Table 21 - Additional Instruments for Institutions and Overidentification Tests
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
First Polity Score First XCONST Score
Panel C: Overidentification Test (P value of a Hansen C statistic for the orthogonality of EDE * Colony y/n)
Notes: Table 21 presents additional instruments for institutions and the associated overidentification tests. Panel A presents the first stage relation between the instruments 
and the rule of law, Panel B the second stage relationship, and Panel C the heteroscedasticity robust Hansen C statistic. The p value corresponding to the orthogonality of 
"EDE * colony dummy" is reported. Columns 1 to 4 include early institutional quality from the Polity IV database. Early institutional score is the earliest available score 
from 1900-1911 in Columns 1 and 3 or the earliest available score in the interval 1900 to 1961 in Columns 2 and 4. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for the POLITY 
measure, which lies between -10 and 10, while Columns 3 and 4 present the results for XCONST, which can take values of 1 to 7. For both measures, a higher score is 
associated with better institutions. Column 5 uses ethnic fractionalization, which is from Alesina et al. (2004), takes values from 0 and 1, and is higher in more 
heterogeneous countries. Column 6 adds the Warsaw Pact dummy, Column 7 adds French and British legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. (1999) and Column 8 
adds both the Warsaw Pact dummy and the two legal origins dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Standardized Average Temperature (Parker (1997))
Former Colonies
Notes: The upper plot of Figure 1 presents the relation between average temperature and property rights institutions for countries that have 
not been colonized. The lower plot of Figure 1 presents the same relation for former colonies. Average temperature is from Parker (1997) 
and standardized. The measure of institutional quality is the 1996 to 2004 average score of the rule of law from Kaufman (1995). 
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66Figure 2 - Settler Mortality and Early Disease Environment 
Notes: Figure 2 presents the relation between the standardized natural logarithm of the annual settler mortality rate from Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) and the predicted value of Early Disease Environment. The measure "EDE" is displayed, which is predicted from Column 5 of 
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Ln Settler Mortality by Acemoglu et al. (2001) standardized
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Early Disease Environment
Former Colonies
Notes: The upper plot of Figure 3 presents the relation between early disease environment (EDE) and property rights institutions for 
countries that have not been colonized. The lower plot of Figure 3 presents the same relation for former colonies. Countries are denoted 
by Worldbank country codes. EDE is predicted from Column 5 of Table 6 partialing out the sampling population dummies. In the lower 
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68Figure 4 - Disease and Income in Former Colonies and Non-Colonized Nations
Notes: The upper plot of Figure 4 presents the relation between early disease environment (EDE) and per capita GDP for countries that 
have not been colonized. The lower plot of Figure 4 presents the same relation for former colonies. Countries are denoted by Worldbank 
country codes. EDE is predicted from Column 5 of Table 6 partialing out the sampling population dummies. In the lower plot, Guinea 
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69Figure 5 - Discrepancies Between Historical Mortality Estimates and Geographic Projections
Notes: The upper part of Figure 3 presents a scatter plot of the mortality rates from Acemoglu et al. (2001) versus the revised rates 
from Albouy (2006) (Revision 2). In this figure, since the mortality rates collected from historical sources are in some cases 
extrapolated to neighboring nations, one circle can represent multiple countries. The lower part of Figure presents a scatter plot of 
EDE and EDE Albouy. EDE is predicted from Column 2 of Table 6, while EDE Albouy is predicted from Column 6 of Table 6. Both 
measures are not standardized. In both plots, the 45 degree line is displayed. Also, in both plots, World Bank country codes are 
displayed if the respective mortality rates or levels of disease environment differ by more than 0.3 log points (35%). The two countries 
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Comparing the Instrumented Mortality Series
SGP
MYS
70Swiss National Bank Working Papers published since 2004: 
 
2004-1  Samuel Reynard: Financial Market Participation and the Apparent Instability of 
Money Demand 
 
2004-2  Urs W. Birchler and Diana Hancock: What Does the Yield on Subordinated  
  Bank Debt Measure? 
  
2005-1  Hasan Bakhshi, Hashmat Khan and Barbara Rudolf: The Phillips curve under  
 state-dependent  pricing 
 
2005-2  Andreas M. Fischer: On the Inadequacy of Newswire Reports for Empirical  
  Research on Foreign Exchange Interventions 
 
2006-1  Andreas M. Fischer: Measuring Income Elasticity for Swiss Money Demand:  
  What do the Cantons say about Financial Innovation? 
 
2006-2  Charlotte Christiansen and Angelo Ranaldo: Realized Bond-Stock Correlation: 
Macroeconomic Announcement Effects 
 
2006-3  Martin Brown and Christian Zehnder: Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking,  
  and Loan Repayment 
 
2006-4  Hansjörg Lehmann and Michael Manz: The Exposure of Swiss Banks to 
Macroeconomic Shocks – an Empirical Investigation 
 
2006-5  Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche and Stefan Gerlach: Money Growth, Output Gaps and 
Inflation at Low and High Frequency: Spectral Estimates for Switzerland 
 
2006-6  Marlene Amstad and Andreas M. Fischer: Time-Varying Pass-Through from Import 
Prices to Consumer Prices: Evidence from an Event Study with Real-Time Data 
 
2006-7  Samuel Reynard: Money and the Great Disinflation 
 
2006-8  Urs W. Birchler and Matteo Facchinetti: Can bank supervisors rely on market data? 
A critical assessment from a Swiss perspective 
 
2006-9  Petra Gerlach-Kristen: A Two-Pillar Phillips Curve for Switzerland 
 
2006-10  Kevin J. Fox and Mathias Zurlinden: On Understanding Sources of Growth and 
Output Gaps for Switzerland 
 
2006-11  Angelo Ranaldo: Intraday Market Dynamics Around Public Information Arrivals 
 
2007-1  Andreas M. Fischer, Gulzina Isakova and Ulan Termechikov: Do FX traders in 
Bishkek have similar perceptions to their London colleagues? Survey evidence of 
market practitioners’ views 2007-2  Ibrahim Chowdhury and Andreas Schabert: Federal Reserve Policy viewed through 
a Money Supply Lens 
 
2007-3  Angelo Ranaldo: Segmentation and Time-of-Day Patterns in Foreign Exchange 
Markets 
 
2007-4  Jürg M. Blum: Why ‘Basel II’ May Need a Leverage Ratio Restriction 
  
2007-5  Samuel Reynard: Maintaining Low Inflation: Money, Interest Rates, and Policy 
Stance 
 
2007-6  Rina Rosenblatt-Wisch: Loss Aversion in Aggregate Macroeconomic Time Series 
 
2007-7  Martin Brown, Maria Rueda Maurer, Tamara Pak and Nurlanbek Tynaev: Banking 
Sector Reform and Interest Rates in Transition Economies: Bank-Level Evidence 
from Kyrgyzstan 
 
2007-8  Hans-Jürg Büttler: An Orthogonal Polynomial Approach to Estimate the Term 
Structure of Interest Rates 
 
2007-9  Raphael Auer: The Colonial Origins Of Comparative Development: Comment. 
A Solution to the Settler Mortality Debate 
 
2007-10  Franziska Bignasca and Enzo Rossi: Applying the Hirose-Kamada filter to Swiss 
data: Output gap and exchange rate pass-through estimates 
 
2007-11  Angelo Ranaldo and Enzo Rossi: The reaction of asset markets to Swiss National 
Bank communication 
 
2007-12  Lukas Burkhard and Andreas M. Fischer: Communicating Policy Options at the Zero 
Bound 
 
2007-13  Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche, Stefan Gerlach, and Toshitaka Sekine: Monetary 
Factors and Inflation in Japan 
 
2007-14  Jean-Marc Natal and Nicolas Stoffels: Globalization, markups and the natural rate 
of interest 
 
2007-15  Martin Brown, Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano: Information Sharing and Credit: 
Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries 
 
2007-16  Andreas M. Fischer, Matthias Lutz and Manuel Wälti: Who Prices Locally? Survey 
Evidence of Swiss Exporters 
 
2007-17  Angelo Ranaldo and Paul Söderlind: Safe Haven Currencies 
 
 2008-1  Martin Brown and Christian Zehnder: The Emergence of Information Sharing in 
Credit Markets 
 
2008-2  Yvan Lengwiler and Carlos Lenz: Intelligible Factors for the Yield Curve 
 
2008-3  Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche and M. Hashem Pesaran: Forecasting the Swiss 
Economy Using VECX* Models: An Exercise in Forecast Combination Across Models 
and Observation Windows 
 
2008-4  Maria Clara Rueda Maurer: Foreign bank entry, institutional development and 
credit access: firm-level evidence from 22 transition countries 
 
2008-5  Marlene Amstad and Andreas M. Fischer: Are Weekly Inflation Forecasts 
Informative? 
 
2008-6  Raphael Auer and Thomas Chaney: Cost Pass Through in a Competitive Model of 
Pricing-to-Market 
 
2008-7  Martin Brown, Armin Falk and Ernst Fehr: Competition and Relational Contracts: 
The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device 
 


















     Swiss National Bank Working Papers are also available at www.snb.ch, section Publications/Research
Subscriptions or individual issues can be ordered at Swiss National Bank, Fraumünsterstrasse 8, CH-8022 Zurich,
fax +41 44 631 81 14, E-mail library@snb.ch